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The New Nuclear Power Generation   
Licensing Scheme in Its Defining Moment:  
A Regulatory Vessel Equipped to Support a 
Thriving Industry or Drifting Towards Stormy 







This Student Note assesses Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission’s “new” nuclear licensing scheme by way of 
comparison with the old, two-step process under which the industry 
endured an era of dormancy lasting nearly forty years.  With a focus 
on the novel ITAAC review process, this Note argues that while the 
Part 52 process is superior to its predecessor, certain significant 
issues (articulated herein) must be resolved before the new 
regulatory framework can support the economic, environmental, 
safety, and other advantages it aims to achieve. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Now, I know it has been assumed that those who champion 
the environment are opposed to nuclear power. But the fact 
is, even though we have not broken ground on a new 
nuclear power plant in [decades], nuclear energy remains 
our largest source of fuel that produces no carbon 
emissions. To meet our growing energy needs and prevent 
the worst consequences of climate change, we’ll need to 
increase our supply of nuclear power. It’s that simple.1   
 
These words of our current President, hailing from the political party 
historically opposed to nuclear power, are suggestive of a sea of change. 
Despite strong currents of opposition to nuclear power in the United States,2 
                                                 
 1. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Obama Admin. Announces 
Loan Guarantees to Construct New Nuclear Power Reactors in Ga. (Feb. 16, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/obama-administration-announces-loan-
guarantees-construct-new-nuclear-power-reactors (last visited April 16, 2012) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also 
Interview by Jonathan Fahey with Christine Todd Whitman, Former EPA Adm’r and N.J. 
Governor (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/13/christine-todd-whitman-
business-energy-whitman.html (“Unless we embrace . . . nuclear it’s going to be very hard to 
see how we get to a place where we have [twenty-four/seven] reliable, affordable power that 
doesn’t degrade the environment.”). 
 2.  See, e.g., Press Release, Nuclear Info. Res. Serv., Safe, Clean Energy Advocates 
Reject Obama’s Call for More Nuclear Power (Jan. 30, 2010), http://www.nirs.org/press/01-
30-2010/2 (last visited April 16, 2012) (“President Obama must rethink his priorities, and 
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it seems we are in the midst of a “nuclear renaissance”3 in the industry, 
after several decades of dormancy.4 In the recent midterm State of the 
Union address, the President highlighted his proposed energy plan, which 
included nuclear power at the fore, further suggestive of the political 
popularity of facilitating development of the industry.5 
 Many factors are propelling this renaissance. Consider the 
following: increases in fuel prices,6 heightened concerns over global 
warming,7 the Deepwater Horizon disaster,8 unrest in nations that are a 
source of natural gas,9 significant developments in nuclear technology,10 
daunting rates of unemployment,11 rising political support of nuclear 
                                                                                                                 
quickly . . . . Nuclear is not a climate solution; indeed, it would make the problem worse by 
diverting tens of billions of dollars that could be spent on safe, clean, cost-effective energy 
sources.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 3.  See, e.g., Roland M. Frye, Jr., The Current “Nuclear Renaissance” in the United 
States, Its Underlying Reasons, and its Potential Pitfalls, 29 ENERGY L.J. 279, 287 (2008) 
(arguing that the oft-used catch phrase “nuclear renaissance” is in fact a reality in the United 
States). 
 4. See, e.g., Steven Mufson, Firm Applies to Expand Nuclear Plant in Maryland, 
WASH. POST (July 31, 2007), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/07/30/AR2007073001881_pf.html (quoting NRC spokesman who 
noted that Constellation Energy Group’s submission was “the first application to operate and 
build a new reactor that the NRC has received in about 30 years”). 
 5. See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, ¶ 32 (Jan. 25, 2011), 
available at http://www.npr.org/2011/01/26/133224933/transcript-obamas-state-of-union-
address (setting forth his proposal for an energy plan, noting the necessity of nuclear power 
generation within that plan). 
 6.  See, e.g., Derek Thompson, Can the Oil Shock Alone Explain the Financial Crisis, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/print/2009/04/ 
can-the-oil-shock-alone-explain-the-financial-crisis/16459/ (noting that an oil shock could 
possibly have been “a significant catalyzer for the push toward energy reform”). 
 7.  See, e.g., Michael Totty, Nuclear’s Fall—and Rise, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2010, at 
R6 (noting the relationship between global warming and the increased attention on nuclear 
power).   
 8.  See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Obama: Oil Spill Shows Need for Alternative Fuels, 
WALL ST. J. BLOG (May 26, 2010, 4:23 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/05/26/obama-oil-spill-shows-need-for-alternative-fuels/ 
(“[T]he spill in the Gulf, which is just heartbreaking, only underscores the necessity of 
seeking alternative fuel sources.”). 
 9.  See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Oil Flows, But High Prices Jangle Nerves, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 12, 2011, at A12 (noting that unrest in the Middle East has motivated the world to move 
toward alternative energy sources and to examine nuclear power specifically). 
 10.  See, e.g., Nuclear’s Next Generation, ECONOMIST (Dec. 10, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/15048703/ (describing six new designs for nuclear power 
reactors that are alleged to provide advances in safety and efficiency and noting how prior to 
these developments little progress had been made regarding the technology underpinning the 
civilian nuclear power generation since the 1950s). 
 11.  See, e.g., Steve Lohr, The New Jobs in Atomic Energy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/business/energy-environment/22TECH.html 
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power,12 and projected increases in energy demand13—these are just some 
of the forces which together suggest the development of a new fleet of 
nuclear plants in the United States not only makes sense, but is inevitable. 
Our most recent presidential campaign, in which candidates from both 
parties supported nuclear power within their respective energy plans,14 
indicates that the American public is on board. The successful development 
of a new fleet of safe, operational plants would be a titanic achievement 
with far-reaching implications.   
In isolation, the factors noted may suggest that end is inevitable; 
however, various forces are capable of thwarting the course. Finding a 
workable plan to deal with spent fuel, wading through the fallout of the 
global financial crisis, avoiding a catastrophe related to nuclear 
proliferation, and, critically, reviving and maintaining a viable regulatory 
scheme are just a few of the challenges that must be met if this nuclear 
renaissance is to thrive.15 What follows is an analysis of one key 
component: the regulatory scheme, specifically, the licensing of new 
nuclear plants. The current wave of plant development is taking place under 
a new licensing scheme promulgated by Congress and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (“NRC”), a process that is largely untested to 
date.16 A navigable, legally permissible licensing framework is a 
prerequisite for this fleet if it is to avoid the fate of the last tranche of 
nuclear reactors whereby some plants met their demise even before going 
on-line,17 part of a series of events that precipitated an era of dormancy in 
the nuclear industry that lasted upwards of forty years. 
                                                                                                                 
(noting the job creation that will be a consequence of both constructing and operating a new 
nuclear facility). 
 12.  See infra, Part II.C.2 (specifying some of the federal legislation enacted to support 
development of the nuclear industry). 
 13.  See Annual Energy Outlook 2010, Electricity Demand, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(May 11, 2010), http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/archive/aeo10/electricity.html (last visited April 
16, 2012) (projecting that total electricity demand will increase thirty percent by 2035) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 14.  See, e.g., David Jackson, McCain, Obama Promote Nuclear Energy Plans, U.S.A. 
TODAY (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/2008-08-05-
mccain-nuclear_N.htm (noting Democratic and Republican presidential candidates’ support 
of nuclear power in an energy plan, albeit to varying degrees). 
 15.  See Frye, supra note 3, at 287 (setting forth a comprehensive discussion of nine 
factors which could lead to the derailment of the renaissance). 
 16.  See Combined License Applications for New Reactors, NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html (last visited April 16, 2012) 
(indicating that no COL has been issued to date, thus no construction has begun and no 
ITAAC have expired according to Part 52) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Note that “construction” is a term of art. See 10 
C.F.R. § 50.2 (2010) (defining construction); see also, infra notes 101–02 and 
accompanying text (discussing the limited work authorization that allows initial excavation 
and other site work up to the point of laying the foundation). 
 17.  See, e.g., Press Release, Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, NRC Staff Terminates 
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This Note argues that this new regulatory scheme, while superior to 
the old licensing process, must resolve significant licensing issues if it is to 
provide the basis for the thriving nuclear industry that many hope will 
support America’s growing power needs. Part II describes the new 
licensing process affecting the current generation of nuclear plants by way 
of contrast with the old two-step licensing scheme, with an emphasis on the 
novel pre-operational Inspections, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria 
(“ITAAC”)18 review process. Part III describes how, despite the current 
ITAAC review process’s efficiency advantages, in present form, the 
process falls short in two ways: (1) by failure to provide legally sufficient 
opportunity for public participation and (2) by effective reversion to the 
two-step process that has proven antithetical to successful development in 
the nuclear power industry. Part IV describes how operational 
modifications by industry members and the NRC, along with mechanisms 
to provide for administrative flexibility, may provide the regulatory 
foundation that allows the new licensing process to support a thriving 
nuclear energy program. Finally, Part V concludes that the new licensing 
scheme has the potential to provide the regulatory framework for this new 
fleet of reactors to attain enormous energy, environmental, safety, and 
economic advantages—but not without significant additional yet feasible 
steps taken by industry and the regulators.   
 
II.  The New Nuclear Licensing Process 
 
 A thorough understanding of the new licensing process that 
governs this generation of nuclear plants requires a solid grasp of the 
context in which it is currently operating and the underlying historical 
                                                                                                                 
Shoreham License; Authorizes Release of Site (Apr. 12, 1995) (describing the history of the 
Shoreham facility that was shut down in 1987 two years after receiving its operating license, 
having never gone into operation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment); Robert T. Grieves et al., A $1.6 Billion Nuclear Fiasco, 
TIME MAG. (Oct. 31, 1983), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921377,00.html (describing the 
financial, managerial, construction, and other problems at Cincinnati Gas & Electric’s 
Zimmer plant that led to the plant’s cancellation after spending billions of dollars). While the 
Shoreham facility was shut down and never utilized, the Zimmer facility later converted to 
coal-fired generation.  
 18.  See infra Part III (explaining the ITAAC review process at length). Implicit in any 
reference to ITAAC is the following definition: The specific inspections, tests, and analyses 
regarding a single component that the holder of a combined license shall perform, and 
acceptance criteria that “are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that, if 
the inspections, tests, and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, the facility 
has been constructed and will be operated in conformity” with the combined license, the 
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the NRC’s rules and regulations. 10 C.F.R. 
§ 52.17(b)(3) (2011). 
274        3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 269 (2012) 
 
developments that led to the regulatory scheme as it exists today.19 This 
essential building block is set forth in subpart A. Next, subpart B highlights 
specific defects of the old process that the new one intended to cure. With 
this foundation, subpart C describes the technical aspects of the new 
licensing scheme and discusses how it is functioning in its nascent stage. 
Central to this discussion is a keen focus on the novel ITAAC pre-
operational review and its desired role within the regulatory scheme as 
current nuclear plant development makes headway.   
 
A. Historical Context 
 
The Atomic Energy Act of 195420 set forth government approval 
for private access to technical nuclear energy information for the first time, 
signaling the beginning of the end of the government monopoly on nuclear 
technology, thus paving the way for commercial nuclear power 
generation.21 The first fleets of commercial nuclear reactors were licensed 
primarily under the Atomic Energy Commission22 regulations, 
interchangeably referred to herein as the Part 50 regulations, the old 
process, or the two-step process.23 
Plants that went into operation under the two-step process were 
required to obtain separate construction and operating licenses.24 Given the 
                                                 
 19.  For the remainder of this Note, the term “regulatory scheme” will refer specifically 
to the new plant licensing regulations. While nuclear regulations in fact encompass a vastly 
broader range of activities, in this analysis, the term will pertain to the very focused topic at 
issue, the licensing regulations for new nuclear power generation facilities. 
 20.  See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2282 (1954) (amending the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 by adding provisions to govern both civilian and military use of 
nuclear materials, more specifically, the development and regulation of the use of materials 
in American nuclear facilities). 
 21.  See id. § 2011(b) (“[T]he development, use and control of atomic energy shall be 
directed so as to promote world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of 
living, and strengthen free competition in private enterprise.”). 
 22.  The Atomic Energy Commission was the first nuclear regulatory agency in the 
United States; its regulatory functions were transferred to the newly-created NRC by the 
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5814, 5841 (2006) (setting forth the 
AEC’s abolition and transfer of power to the new agency). For the purposes of this Note, 
“NRC” refers to both regulatory agencies. 
 23.  See generally 10 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1976) (setting forth the two-step licensing scheme 
regulating development of the first commercial fleet of nuclear reactors). While Part 50 
licensing regulations went into effect in 1956, see 21 Fed. Reg. 355–60 (Jan. 19, 1956), and 
remain to some extent today, the focus of this section will be on these regulations and their 
effect as they applied to vendors seeking licenses starting in the early 1970s, when vendors 
increased plant size to the 1100–1250 MWE range. 
 24.  See 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(c) (2011) (providing that a construction permit was a 
necessary prerequisite to beginning construction); see also 10 C.F.R. § 50.20(b) (2011) 
(providing that an operating license was a necessary prerequisite for operating a nuclear 
facility).  
NEW NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION 275 
 
nature of the process of building a nuclear facility, the time that lapsed 
between the grant of a construction permit and the grant of an operating 
license was significant.25 The example of the North Anna Power Station 
proves illustrative: the NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board granted 
Virginia Electric Power Company its construction permits for two reactor 
units at the North Anna Power Station in February 1971.26 The operating 
licenses were not granted until April 1978 and August 1980 for Units 1 and 
2 respectively.27 This example is typical in that nearly a decade passed 
between these milestones, a time in which countless modifications to the 
original construction permit were necessarily made.28 Nearly $4 billion was 
exhausted on construction alone (a figure that is dwarfed by the comparable 
construction cost figures for the current fleet).29 And receipt of an operating 
license after these massive expenditures, capital and otherwise, was far 
from certain. 
 The Part 50 licensing regulations required a company pursuing 
development of a nuclear power facility to submit an application to the 
NRC for a construction permit.30 The submission did not represent the 
beginning of the process for a prospective licensee, given the numerous and 
often technical details required in each application;31 rather, it represented 
                                                 
 25.  See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in 
Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 504 (1984) 
(noting that nuclear projects were taking ten to twelve years on average). 
 26.  See Construction Permits CPPR-77 & CPPR-78, Nos. 50-338 & 50-339 (A.E.C. 
Feb. 19, 1971) (issuing a construction permit for North Anna Units 1 and 2). 
 27.  See Facility Operating License, NPF-4, No. 50-338 (N.R.C. Apr. 1, 1978) (issuing 
an operating license for North Anna Unit 1); Virginia Electric and Power Company, Facility 
Operating License, NPF-7, No. 50-339 (N.R.C. Aug. 21, 1980) (issuing an operating license 
for North Anna Unit 2).  
 28.  See, e.g., Amendment No. 9 to Facility Operating License, NPF-4, No. 50-338 
(N.R.C. Feb. 23, 1979) (issuing the ninth amendment to the facility operating license in less 
than one year). 
 29.  See, e.g. Independent Statistics and Analysis, Virginia Nuclear Profile, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/state_profiles/virginia/va.html 
(last visited April 16, 2012) (noting construction costs for North Anna Units 1 and 2) (on file 
with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Most projected figures for the 
new generation of reactors are exponentially higher than those described in the EIA data for 
the first two reactors at North Anna. The projected cost for Vogtle, for example, is $14.5 
billion and counting. See Rob Pavey, Vogtle’s Owners Waiting for Approval, AUGUSTA 
CHRON. (Nov. 10, 2010), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2010-11-10/vogtles-
owners-waiting-approval (noting the estimated project costs as of late 2010). 
 30.  See 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(c) (2011) (“No person may begin the construction of a 
production or utilization facility on a site on which the facility is to be operated until that 
person has been issued . . . a construction permit under this part . . . .”). Note that 
“construction” is a term of art defined by the regulation. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(a) (2010). 
 31.  See 10 C.F.R. § 50.34 (2011) (setting forth the technical requirements that must be 
included in every construction permit application submitted to the NRC for review, such as a 
preliminary and final safety analysis reports (which include environmental and other 
reviews), a physical security plan, and a safeguards contingency plan to name a few).   
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the first major instance in which the regulatory agency would provide 
official review.32 To reach this stage, an applicant must have participated in 
substantial financial planning, business negotiations, safety and 
environmental research, and other preliminary activities. Upon the NRC 
staff’s decision that the application was sufficient—that is, the applicant 
met the regulatory requirements set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 50.34—the staff 
would then docket the application and set the schedule for a comprehensive 
review.33 A brief look at an application that reached this stage reveals the 
significant investment that was necessary to simply “initiate” the licensing 
process.34   
Upon acceptance for staff review, the agency would schedule, 
publicize, and hold a public meeting at the contemplated site to inform the 
public of the proposed location and type of plant, along with safety, 
environmental, and other relevant aspects of the pending application.35 The 
NRC would hold several such meetings while an application was under 
review to keep the public appraised of the progress throughout the reactor 
licensing process.36 Once the NRC staff and the Advisory Committee on 
Reactor Safeguards37 completed their respective reviews, their findings 
were submitted to the Commission by way of letter to the NRC Chairman.38 
 Prior to the issuance of a construction permit for any commercial 
generation facility, the Atomic Energy Act mandates a licensing hearing39 
conducted by the NRC’s three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
                                                 
 32.   Cf. 10 C.F.R. § 2.101(a)(1) (2011) (setting forth the procedural requirements for 
submitting applications, and explicitly granting prospective applicants permission to 
informally communicate with the NRC prior to filing an application). 
 33.  See 10 C.F.R. § 2.102 (2011) (setting forth docketing and other processes for 
administrative review of an application).  
 34.  See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., Summary of Application, No. 50-
286 (A.E.C. Feb. 25, 1969) (summarizing the application for a license for Indian Point Unit 
3 in eighty-two pages of text, implying that substantial technical and other workup was 
involved prior to submitting an application). 
 35.  See, e.g., Backgrounder on Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Process, NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM’N (July 2005), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/fact-sheets/licensing-process-bg.html (describing the initial site meeting held by 
the NRC). 
 36.  See id. (describing the informal public meetings the NRC held to keep the public 
apprised of developments regarding potential projects). 
 37.  See id. (“The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) [is] an 
independent group that provides advice on reactor safety to the five-member Commission 
[and] reviews each application to construct or operate a nuclear power plant.”). 
 38.  See id. (noting that the ACRS submits its findings to Chairman of NRC). 
 39.  See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (“The Commission 
shall hold a hearing after thirty days’ notice and publication once in the Federal Register, on 
each application under section 2133 . . . of this title for a construction permit for a facility 
. . . .”); see also infra, note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the mandatory hearing 
requirement in the context of the new licensing regulations, whereby this hearing occurs at 
the COL stage). 
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(“ASLB”).40 This public hearing was held once the staff completed its 
review and prepared the Safety and Evaluation Report (detailing the 
expected effects of the proposed plant on public health and safety) and the 
Final Environmental Impact Statement (having received and addressed 
comments to its draft statement from appropriate government agencies and 
the public).41 Members of the public were permitted to submit written or 
oral statements or to petition for leave to intervene as official parties in the 
hearing.42 Beginning in the early 1970s, petitions to intervene and submit 
contentions started to flow into the NRC.43  
Aspects of the proceeding involving Houston Lighting and Power 
Company’s (“HL&P”) pursuit of a construction permit for its Allens Creek 
Nuclear Generating Station provide a useful illustration of how, under the 
old process, procedural rules were so liberally interpreted so as to deprive 
them of their facial meaning with regard to intervening and submitting 
contentions in a hearing. HL&P applied for a construction permit in August 
1973, and in March 1978 the ASLB initiated the mandatory hearing 
proceeding by inviting the filing of petitions to intervene and submission of 
contentions.44 In response to a pro se litigant’s petition for leave to 
intervene, the ASLB issued an unpublished opinion in March 1980 in which 
it rejected the petitioner’s contention, ultimately denying his petition for 
leave to intervene.45 Under the old regulations, an outright denial of a 
petition was subject to interlocutory appellate review, and the petitioner 
                                                 
 40.  See 10 C.F.R. § 2.321 (2011) (granting the Commission authority to establish 
ASLBs to conduct administrative hearings regarding granting, suspending, revoking, or 
amending licenses). 
 41.  See, e.g., Consol. Energy Co. of New York Construction Permit Hearing 
Transcript, No. 50-247 (A.E.C. Dec. 18, 1970) (referencing the Safety and Evaluation 
Report and the Final Environmental Impact Statement).  
 42.  See 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(a) (2010) (“A person who is not a party . . . may, in the 
discretion of the presiding officer, be permitted to make a limited appearance by making an 
oral or written statement of his or her position on the issues at any session of the hearing or 
any prehearing conference . . . .”). 
 43.  See infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (discussing the low procedural 
hurdles for intervening in a licensing proceeding, derived not from the regulations 
themselves, rather from the interpretation of those regulations). Another significant reason 
for this increase in public intervention was the fact that vendors increased output of facilities 
by about one-third around this time. 
 44.  See Donald K. Hill, Regulating the Termination of Proposed Nuclear Power Plant 
in Texas: The Allens Creek Experience, 15 ST. MARY’S L. J. 299, 301 n.7 (setting forth the 
chronology of events related to Houston Lighting and Power Company’s Allens Creek 
project).  
 45.  See Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station 
Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 N.R.C. 542, 543–44 (1980) (setting forth the facts of the proceeding 
before the ASLB which were the subject of the appeal). 
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timely filed an appeal.46 In addition to granting the unrepresented petitioner 
greater leeway in satisfying the pleading standard in these proceedings,47 
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (the “Appeal Board”) 
reversed the ASLB’s order denying petitioner’s intervention, thus reviving 
his petition.48   
In so doing, the Appeal Board looked to uniformly established 
precedent49 interpreting the language of the relevant NRC procedural 
regulations.50 Despite the fact that the NRC Rules of Practice contain an 
explicit demand for supplying a basis for a contention with reasonable 
specificity as a prerequisite for intervening, the Appeal Board found that 
those rules “have been uniformly interpreted” merely to require a petitioner 
to state reasons for a contention,51 with no additional requirement that he 
attempt to justify such reasons.52 Through consistent application of this 
uniform interpretation, the appeal board effectively wrote out the 
procedural requirement set forth in § 2.714 and replaced it with a 
significantly more lenient standard, defined by the agency’s case law. 
The practical effect of this decision regarding Allens Creek was a 
holding that granted leave for petitioner to intervene.53 The appeal board 
rejected arguments of both the NRC staff and HL&P, claiming the alleged 
basis was “impermissibly vague” and insufficient under the plain language 
                                                 
 46.  See 10 C.F.R. § 2.749(b) (1980) (“[A]n order wholly denying a petition for leave 
to intervene . . . is appealable by the petitioner on the question of whether the petition 
. . . should have been granted in whole or in part.”).   
 47.  See Houston Lighting and Power Co., ALAB-590, 11 N.R.C. at 546 (“[A]lthough 
a totally deficient pleading may not be justified on the basis that it was prepared without the 
assistance of counsel, a pro se petitioner is not to be held to those standards of clarity and 
precision to which a lawyer might reasonably be expected to adhere.”(citation omitted)). 
 48.  See id. at 551 (reversing and remanding the ASLB decision for further 
consideration of the petition for leave on the grounds set forth in the opinion). 
 49.  See Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), 
ALAB-130, 6 A.E.C. 423, 426 (1973) (affirming the ASLB’s grant of a petition to intervene 
and interpreting contentions as meeting the requirements set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a) 
without requiring a detailed evidence to support the contention). Note that the precedent 
cited was issued in 1973, thus this liberal interpretation of the regulation had been applied by 
the agency for several years by the time of this Allens Creek decision. 
 50.  See 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a) (1980) (stating that interested parties may submit a 
petition to intervene that shall identify “specific aspect or aspects of the subject matter of the 
proceeding as to which he wishes to intervene and [set] forth with particularity both the facts 
pertaining to his interest and the basis for his contentions. . .”) (emphasis added); id. 
§ 2.714(b) (requiring a petition set forth the basis for each contention with reasonable 
specificity).  
 51.  Houston Lighting and Power Co., ALAB-590, 11 N.R.C. at 549. 
 52.  See id. at 548 (noting that a reason supporting the contention would suffice and 
that providing detailed evidence was not necessary in a petition for leave to intervene). 
 53.  See id. at 551 (reversing and remanding the ASLB’s decision denying the petition 
to intervene with instructions to accept the contention and allow petitioner to intervene). 
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of the agency’s own procedural rule;54 instead, it relied solely on 
petitioner’s assertion that a marine biomass farm, alleged to be a viable 
alternative energy source to a nuclear facility, was not considered in 
HL&P’s application.55 The appeal board arrived at this conclusion despite 
its expressed doubt that a marine biomass farm was a viable alternative56 
and despite petitioner’s reliance on a report that made no such claim.57  
Some opponents of nuclear power generation recognized the 
agency’s generous granting of petitions to intervene in licensing 
proceedings. With that, the floodgates opened: Those opposed to nuclear 
power were able to exploit the process as a tactic to anchor the proceeding 
from moving forward for significant periods of time.58 Individuals and 
organized groups alike were capable of generating a storm within the NRC 
hearing process with relative ease.59 
To fully comprehend the problematic nature of the bifurcated 
process, recognition of the context in which this occurred is critical: Note 
the infancy of the overall process at the permit application phase for this 
generation of facilities. The issues that tended to surface in these hearings 
were merely those of site suitability: geology, seismology, meteorology, 
hydrology, and environmental concerns, along with any other possible 
impacts of construction and operation.60 The structure of the old licensing 
process was such that more often than not, plant design was merely a 
concept when construction began (and an even less developed concept 
                                                 
 54.  Id. at 545. 
 55.  See id. (stating the petitioner’s contention exclusively relied on the Project 
Independence report). 
 56.  See id. at 549 (noting that the petitioner should be granted leave to intervene 
despite the appeal board’s explicit skepticism regarding the claim’s merit). 
 57.  See id. at 555 (dissenting opinion) (“The [Project Independence Report] itself does 
not offer the marine biomass farm as such an alternative.”). 
 58.  See, e.g., Ann Carl, The Lloyd Harbor Study Group Intervention—A Response, 28 
BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 31, 31 (1972) (describing one groups opposition strategy). 
They stated: 
[T]he construction of nuclear plants should be held up. We, therefore, made 
the decision to oppose all nuclear plants proposed . . . . [In the Shoreham 
hearing,] we decided not to limit our intervention to one or two highly specific 
and relevant issues . . . but [instead] to bring as much adversary evidence to 
the hearing as we could. Facts and opinions would then be sworn and 
documented in the record[.] 
Id. The hearing transcript in that proceeding turned out to be over thirteen thousand pages 
long, and their strategy was employed despite their admission that “winning” in the 
construction permit hearing was not possible. Id.   
 59.  See id. (describing a highly organized group’s strategy to intervene and noting 
how their strategy “undoubtedly influenced other interventions”). 
 60.  See, e.g., Houston Lighting and Power Co., ALAB-590, 11 N.R.C. at 545 (“I 
contend building and operating a marine biomass farm, or other biomass production systems, 
would be environmentally preferable to [Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station] and ask 
the Board to deny the permit . . . .”). 
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when the application for the construction permit was first submitted to the 
agency).61 
Given the incipient phase of a particular project, hopeful 
intervenors had the ability to submit contentions on these site suitability 
issues with ease; however, the opportunity for other effective objections 
generally did not present itself at this stage—this was so because the 
applicants themselves had not yet fully developed the specifications 
regarding design and operation of the facility, leaving little to contest at this 
point with regard to significant issues that would eventually require critical 
evaluation before the NRC could grant an operating license.62 With this 
understanding of the construction permit phase of the old regulatory process 
and the context in which it operated, one might sense the storm brewing 
while the applicant steered toward step two of the process: obtaining an 
operating license. 
With a Part 50 construction permit in hand, an applicant had the 
green light from the agency to commence construction.63 While companies 
advanced toward seeking to obtain an operating license, much transpired—
this phase typically lasted several years and a majority of the components 
were actually developed and implemented during this time.64 The broad 
outlines set forth in the construction permit application as proposals to meet 
the § 50.34 requirements were actualized while construction was ongoing.65 
However, nuclear generation facility projects that were initiated in the 
1970s met a harsh reality after construction was complete—in 1983, for 
example, the plants completed that year cost approximately ten times the 
                                                 
 61.  See, e.g., Carl, supra note 58, at 33 (describing one expert’s testimony that “it 
would be impossible to predict” if the utility could comply with the agency’s criteria since 
“no design had been presented and none of the loads, stresses, or safety margins were 
known”). It is important to understand that even the lapse of time between the initial 
application and the eventual grant of a construction permit could be substantial. Oftentimes, 
the NRC staff determined that the application was insufficient, precipitating a period of 
back-and-forth between the prospective applicant and the agency until the staff was satisfied 
that the application requirements set forth in § 50.34 were met. Even when the staff accepted 
the application for official review, substantial time passed while the agency performed its in-
depth review; all the while, design specifics took shape. 
 62.  See, e.g., id. (implying that specific challenges to the design were impossible since 
design was not defined at the construction permit stage). 
 63.  See 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(c) (2011) (suggesting that once the permit was obtained, 
construction of a facility was permitted). A notable and often-used exception to the 
construction permit requirement is the Limited Work Authorization, see infra notes 101–02 
and accompanying text (discussing the Limited Work Authorization in the context of the 
new licensing process). 
 64.  Cf. Pierce, supra note 25, at 504 (noting that construction took on average over a 
decade and that there was often a “significant disparity between prediction and reality” with 
regards to completing a facility).  
 65.  Cf. id. (noting that completed plants often cost ten times the amount initially 
projected, implying that the conceptual design at the outset of a project was developed and 
substantially altered while construction was ongoing). 
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amount of the initial projections and took an average of ten to twelve years 
to finish construction.66  
It is this context that the next step under the Part 50 process took 
place, whereby licensees had to apply for an operating license as the 
construction phase was nearing its end—obtaining such a license was a 
regulatory prerequisite to loading fuel to begin operation.67 While a public 
hearing was not mandatory as was the case in the construction permit 
application phase, the agency did provide an opportunity for one.68 
Because a majority of a plant’s components were designed 
throughout the construction process, entirely different sets of issues were 
the subject of public contentions in the operation license proceedings.69 
Consideration for an operating license required the agency’s evaluation of 
several issues, for example, safety concerns, conformity with the 
construction permit (even though a significant percentage of the reactor 
design took place after the construction permit was granted), adequate 
management of thousands of contractors and subcontractors, and other 
concerns, all of which required intensive documentation of construction and 
management thereof in order to provide assurance to the agency upon 
review.70 The issues that surfaced in the operating license proceedings, 
therefore, were mostly those of quality assurance, and the scope of these 
proceedings was broad. 
In an operating license proceeding, the utility carried the burden of 
proving that the design was adequate and the plant had been constructed 
accordingly.71 An application required a final safety analysis report.72 
Consider the challenge for hopeful licensees: The implementation of each 
                                                 
 66.  See, e.g., id. (noting how experts projected that nuclear facilities would be 
relatively inexpensive when projects were initiated, which was not the reality when all was 
said and done). 
 67.  See 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(c) (2011) (setting forth the license requirement). 
 68.  See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (“The Commission 
shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the 
proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such proceeding.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 69.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting that the typical issues in the 
mandatory hearing in the construction permit proceeding were those related to site 
suitability). 
 70.  See, e.g., Joseph F. Hennessey, Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants by the Atomic 
Energy Commission, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 495 (1974) (noting that issues that went 
unresolved following the construction permit application review were triggering operating 
license hearings in almost all cases in 1974). 
 71.  See, e.g., Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-24, 
19 N.R.C. 1418, 1437 (1984) (noting that the applicant had the burden of proof once the 
intervenor met the threshold for admitting contentions in an operating license proceeding). 
 72.  See NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N., supra note 35, ¶ 15 (noting that 
construction permit holders must submit a Final Safety Analysis Report with their operating 
license applications). 
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component was carried on by thousands of contractors and subcontractors 
that the licensee had to manage; further, to ensure an adequate record for 
agency review, a strict system of documented inspections was necessary. 
While the public’s participation played a critical role in identifying safety-
related components that were not implemented according to quality 
assurance standards, that process also provided another avenue for 
intervenors to inject chaos into the proceeding—they could buoy the project 
for months or even years based on an administrative mishap as simple as 
incomplete paperwork, even absent an underlying safety issue.73 Further, 
this generation of reactors obtained construction permits at a time when 
nuclear technology was largely underdeveloped; consequently, as the 
industry matured and construction progressed, changes were necessarily 
(and prudently) incorporated.74 This created a predicament in which a 
preferable design technology could be challenged in the operating license 
proceeding based on failure to comply with the construction permit, 
notwithstanding the design’s safety superiority.75 
The effect of the chaotic adjudicatory proceedings under the two-
step licensing process and each of its inherent challenges discussed herein 
converged with several external factors to halt the ordering of new nuclear 
power facilities for over thirty years.76 Next, this Note will highlight the 
specific defects of the process just outlined, defects which Congress and the 
regulators intended to cure with the new licensing scheme. 
 
B.  What Went Wrong?  The Defects of the Two-Step Licensing Process 
 
 To comprehend the problems of the bifurcated licensing process, 
imagine the situation facing the project manager of a utility company 
building a nuclear power facility under the Part 50 regulations, going before 
the board of directors to discuss the company’s pending operating license 
application. It is the eleventh hour in this two-step process; billions of 
                                                 
 73.  See, e.g., Vance L. Sailor, The Role of the Lloyd Harbor Study Group in the 
Shoreham Hearings—An Assessment, 28 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 25, 25 (1972) 
(concluding that an opposition group “delayed construction . . . by at least two years,” 
estimating the resulting “cost to the [utility’s] customers will be in excess of $100 million,” 
and suggesting that was part of the strategy to prolong the proceeding rather than a concern 
for safety). 
 74.  See, e.g., GEORGE T. MAZUZAN & J. SAMUEL WALKER, CONTROLLING THE ATOM: 
THE BEGINNINGS OF NUCLEAR REGULATION 1946–1962 385 (1985) (noting that the “evolving 
nature of atomic technology dictated revisions in design as a reactor facility moved from its 
construction phase to operation”). 
 75.  See 10 C.F.R. § 50.57(1) (2011) (requiring a construction to be completed in 
conformance with the construction permit). 
 76.  See White House Office of Press Sec’y, supra note 1 and accompanying text 
(noting that new nuclear plant construction has not taken place in the United States in over 
three decades). 
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dollars have been spent; costs are escalating while the license proceeding 
ensues; an adverse finding might require tearing out a segment, going back 
to the drawing board, redesigning, and rebuilding, setting the project back 
even further financially and otherwise. And obtaining a license to operate is 
anything but a certainty. Clearly, this was not an enviable position. The 
projects of some hopeful vendors even met their demise at this stage—in 
essence, continuing the proceedings became economically unviable—and a 
new operating plant never became a reality.77 
 The old licensing process proved unworkable for several reasons, 
and together these provided an impetus for the agency to promulgate the 
Part 52 licensing regulations.78 First, this generation of hopeful nuclear 
power vendors initiated their projects relying on unproven design, creating 
an environment in which the risk involved in these projects was immense.79 
Every aspect of the project had a great element of unpredictability: the 
design might change with technological advancement, the influence of the 
public in different phases was difficult to gauge, unforeseeable external 
factors influenced costs and other aspects of a project, and critically, the 
agency’s ultimate grant of a license to operate was anything but a certainty. 
The new licensing scheme aims to capitalize on technological advances80 
that allow for reliable standardization, which in turn will provide the 
foundation for simplifying the management on the industry side and quality 
assurance monitoring on the regulatory side, all of which will facilitate 
safer and more efficient development of nuclear power plants.81 
 Second and closely related to unproven design, safety issues were 
not fully resolved when the agency gave the approval to commence 
construction.82 As was the case with most aspects of building, the safety 
design took place throughout the construction phase, and assurance that 
safety issues were adequately dealt with was not available until the NRC 
                                                 
 77.  See Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting 
the fate of the Shoreham and Zimmer plants, which, with hundreds of millions of dollars of 
sunken costs, decided to terminate their projects because pursing it further had become 
economically unviable). 
 78.  See Backgrounder on Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Process, supra note 35 (“In 
an effort to improve regulatory efficiency and add greater predictability to the process, in 
1989 the NRC established alternative licensing processes in 10 CFR Part 52 that included a 
combined license.”).  
 79.  See Carl, supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting the lack of design at the 
construction permit application stage). 
 80. See Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses 
for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,372 (Apr. 18, 1989) (noting the 
agency’s goals of safety and reliability that could come from utilizing standard designs, 
which themselves have been made possible by advances in nuclear technology). 
 81.  See id. (noting that the agency’s rulemaking was in part driven by attaining 
standardization and the enhanced safety that would be enabled by such standardization). 
 82.  See Carl, supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting that a facility’s design was 
typically only a concept when a licensee commenced construction). 
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completed its review and granted an operating license. This further 
contributed to the unpredictable nature of the project and made real the 
possibility that the agency would deny an application for an operating 
license based on design or similar issues.83 The Part 52 regulations aim to 
resolve all safety and environmental issues before construction begins, thus 
reducing the immense risk and providing some level of certainty before 
enormous capital commitments are expended.84 
 Third, public participation under the old regulations was untimely 
and chaotic. Further, the regulations had the unintended consequence of 
allowing petitioners to use the process as a tactic against licensees.85 The 
new regulations contemplate mechanisms for timely, meaningful 
participation; yet, they limit the ability of opponents of nuclear power 
generation to use the process as a weapon for stalling the proceedings and 
forcing vendors to contribute resources to litigating frivolous issues.86 
 Each of these defects significantly contributed to the great 
inefficiencies inherent in developing a nuclear power plant under the old 
regime. Agency disapproval at the operating license review stage sent 
applicants back to try again until they got it right.87 This regulatory flaw 
eventually contributed to an environment in which projects became 
economically unfeasible.88 The NRC, while acknowledging that its role was 
not that of an economic regulator, took the lessons of history and 
recognized that the viability of new nuclear development depended on the 
                                                 
 83.  See Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, supra note 17 (referring to the nuclear facilities 
that encountered debilitating setbacks at the operating license stage). Note that the agency 
did not outright deny an operating license in these proceedings; rather, repeated, adverse 
findings contributed to escalating costs which eventually led to a business decision that the 
projects were economically unfeasible. 
 84.  See Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses 
for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,373 (Apr. 18, 1989) (“The 
Commission’s intent with this rulemaking is only to have a sensible and stable procedural 
framework in place for the consideration of future designs, and to make it possible to resolve 
safety and environmental issues before plants are built, rather than after.”). 
 85.  See supra Part II.A (describing how the timing and liberal grant of public 
participation brought about chaotic licensing proceedings).  
 86.  See, e.g., Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined 
Licenses for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,373 (Apr. 18, 1989) (noting 
that the agency’s goal is to create a stable licensing framework, not to keep the general 
public out of the process); see also infra, note 148 and accompanying text (noting additional 
protections in the form of legislative enactments that address this problem, particularly the 
“Standby Support” Provision). 
 87.  See 10 C.F.R. § 50.57 (2011) (noting the requirements that must be met before the 
agency’s issue of an operating license, implying that no license would be granted until the 
applicant met each of those requirements). 
 88.  See Pierce, supra note 25 at 498–99 (discussing “mistakes in retrospect” among 
the fleet of reactors initiated in the 1970s whereby economics precluded projects from 
moving forward and some were even abandoned or cancelled after billions of dollars were 
spent).  
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creation of a proper incentive structure that would provide licensees with 
regulatory stability.89 Next, this Note will turn to the product of that 
undertaking.  
 
C.  The Next Generation of Nuclear Power Plants in America: The New 
Licensing Framework 
 
 In 1989, the NRC established new alternatives for nuclear plant 
licensing that are set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 52.90 Part 52 describes a three-
part process in which a hopeful vendor may submit one application that 
combines each of these three parts:91 an early site permit,92 standard design 
certification,93 and a combined construction and operating license.94 The 
combined license provides for a one-step process with a mandatory hearing 
that aims to proceed more smoothly than hearings of the prior generation, 
while continuing to give the public adequate opportunity to participate.95 
 
1. Basics of the Part 52 Licensing Regulations with a Focus on the Novel 
ITAAC Provisions 
 
In order to avoid the problems inherent in the old process whereby 
safety and environmental concerns remained after the issuance of a 
construction permit,96 Part 52 allows an early site permit (“ESP”) 
application to be filed, in which a vendor requests Commission approval of 
                                                 
 89.  See, e.g., Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined 
Licenses for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,376 (Apr. 18, 1989) (noting 
the sought-after regulatory stability that could eventually support standardization and the 
benefits that would come with that). 
 90.  See Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses 
for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,386 (Apr. 18, 1989) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 
52) (setting forth a new part of the regulations specifying review procedures and licensing 
applications for these new licenses and certifications). 
 91.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.8 (2010) (“An applicant for a license under this part may 
combine in its application several applications for different kinds of licenses . . . [and] may 
incorporate by reference in its application information contained in previous applications, 
statements, or reports filed with the Commission.”). 
 92.  See id. at Subpart A (setting forth the requirements for submitting an application 
for an Early Site Permit). 
 93.  See id. at Subpart B (setting forth the requirements for submitting an application 
for standard Design Certifications). 
 94.  See id. at Subpart C (setting forth the requirements for submitting an application 
for combined licenses). 
 95.  See id. at pt. 2, Subpart L (setting forth the informal hearing procedures for NRC 
adjudications). 
 96.  See supra Part II.B at notes 82–84 (discussing the problems arising when a 
construction permit was issued prior to complete resolution of safety and environmental 
issues). 
286        3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 269 (2012) 
 
the plant site itself.97 An early site permit resolves site safety, 
environmental protection, and emergency preparedness issues, and the 
review takes place exclusive of the specifics of actual reactor design.98 Both 
prior to application and during NRC staff review, the NRC will generally 
hold several meetings with the applicant that are open to the public in order 
to provide the general public with access to information regarding the 
safety and environmental aspects of the proposed project.99 The 
Commission will hold a mandatory public hearing on the Early Site Permit 
once the ACRS and NRC staffs have each completed their respective safety 
reviews. However, unlike contentions under the old regulatory regime, a 
stricter pleading standard must be met before the agency will admit 
contentions in the mandatory hearing: “The presiding officer shall not admit 
contentions proffered by any party concerning an assessment of the benefits 
of construction and operation of the reactor or reactors, or an analysis of 
alternative energy sources if those issues were not addressed by the 
applicant in the early site permit application.”100 
 The ESP might be accompanied by an extremely useful regulatory 
mechanism known as the limited work authorization (“LWA”), which 
allows hopeful vendors to begin limited work at a site while a license or 
                                                 
 97.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.12 (2010) (describing the scope of the early site permit 
provisions). 
 98.  See id. § 52.17 (setting forth the technical information required in an application 
for an early site permit, specifically, a site safety analysis report and a complete 
environmental report, which include emergency plans and the proposed ITAAC related to 
the proposed site of the facility); see also Backgrounder on Nuclear Power Plant Licensing 
Process, supra note 35 (listing the ESP application requirements). The early site permit 
should include the following:  
[S]ite boundaries; seismic, meteorologic, hydrolic, and geologic data; location 
and description of any industrial, military, or transportation facilities and 
routes; existing and projected future population of the surrounding area; 
evaluation of alternative sites; proposed general location of each plant planned 
to be on the site; number, type[,] and power level of the plants planned for the 
site; maximum discharges from the plant; type of plant cooling system to be 
used; radiation dose consequences of hypothetical accidents; and plans for 
coping with emergencies. 
Id. 
 99.  See Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses 
for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,374 (April 18, 1989) (noting that 
contrary to some allegations that the agency was attempting to remove the public from the 
process, the NRC was moving the bulk of the direct public involvement to the front end of a 
project). 
 100.  10 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2010). Compare id. (disallowing explicitly contentions that 
suggest alternative energy sources), with Houston Lighting and Power Co., ALAB-590, 11 
N.R.C. at 545 (interpreting the Part 2 and Part 50 regulations to allow a contention that 
suggested a marine biomass farm as an alternative to a nuclear power generation facility).  
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permit application is under agency review.101 This authorizes performance 
of non-safety site preparation activities to be carried on while the 
application is under review, at the risk of the applicant.102 
In another effort to avoid the uncertainties regarding design that 
inundated the entire process under the two-step regime, the Part 52 
regulations set forth the process for obtaining an agency-issued grant of a 
standard design certification,103 which, if granted, is valid for fifteen 
years.104 These provisions provide a means for simplifying the process and 
approving a standard design (independent of any site) that may later be 
incorporated into a combined license.105 The agency certifies a standard 
design via a rulemaking process in which notice and an opportunity for 
public comment are required.106 If certification is granted, the standard 
design will be published in an appendix to the new licensing regulations.107   
A novel addition to the Part 52 regulations is a requirement of each 
application for a standard design certification:   
 
[It] must . . . contain . . . [t]he inspections, tests, analyses, 
and acceptance criteria that are necessary and sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurance that, if the inspections, tests, 
and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, 
a facility that incorporates the design certification has been 
constructed and will be operated in conformity with the 
design certification provisions[.]108 
                                                 
 101.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2010) (citing 10 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2010)) (authorizing 
applicants to “perform the driving of piles, subsurface preparation, placement of backfill, 
concrete, or permanent retaining walls within an excavation, installation of the 
foundation . . . any of which are for [safety-related structures, systems, or components] of 
the facility”). Note that this section cross-references the Part 50 regulations. This regulatory 
vehicle was available under the old process as well. 
 102.  See id. § 50.10(f) (“Any activities undertaken under a [LWA] are entirely at the 
risk of the applicant, and . . . the issuance of the [LWA] has no bearing on the issuance of a 
construction permit or combined license with respect to the requirements of the Act, and 
rules, regulations, or orders issued [thereunder].”). 
 103.  See id. § 52.41 (noting that the provisions set forth the requirements and 
procedures for obtaining a standard design certification exclusive of a construction permit 
under Part 50 or a combined license under Part 52). 
 104.  See id.§ 52.55(a) (“[A] standard design certification issued under this subpart is 
valid for [fifteen] years from the date of issuance.”). 
 105.  See id. § 52.43 (noting that a combined operating license may incorporate a 
standard design by reference to the standard design certification). 
 106.  See id. § 52.143 (stating that the NRC staff will make and publish a determination 
of acceptability of a standard design after completion of its review and receipt of a report by 
the ACRS). But see id. § 52.51(b) (noting that the Commission, in its discretion, may hold a 
legislative-type hearing in a standard design certification review proceeding). 
 107.  Cf. id. § 52.145 (noting that the approved standard designs will be used and relied 
upon in future applications for licenses that incorporate a design by reference). 
 108.  Id. § 52.47(b)(1). 
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This provision sets forth one of the more innovative aspects of the new 
licensing process, commonly referred to as the ITAAC review process.109   
The third component part of the new regulatory scheme is the 
combined construction and operating license (“COL”). A COL is an effort 
to resolve the defects inherent in the bifurcated process by allowing an 
applicant to incorporate by reference a preapproved standard reactor design 
and site in its license application, which if granted is both a construction 
license and a (conditional) operating license.110 Where uncertainty plagued 
the two-step process, this mechanism of combining three parts into one step 
is an effort to reduce the risk placed on the vendor by resolving issues on 
the front end (before construction even begins and substantial financial 
investment made).111 
With the goal of enhancing efficiency and predictability, a COL 
application allows an applicant to incorporate by reference an early site 
permit and a design certification, essentially addressing all three parts in 
one combined step.112 The COL application itself requires much of the 
same information required under the two-step process.113 
The mandatory hearing prior to the issuance of a construction 
permit under the old Part 50 regulations remains in the new process at the 
COL application stage.114 However, the mandatory proceeding under a Part 
52 COL hearing proceeds in a vastly different manner from the construction 
permit hearings of the previous generation of nuclear facilities, due in large 
part to significant administrative changes promulgated by the NRC in 
another effort to provide a more efficient licensing scheme.115 In 2004, the 
                                                 
 109.  See infra Part III.A (providing a detailed discussion on the ITAAC review 
process). Note that this regulatory innovation is not exclusive to the Design Certification 
application. While the majority of ITAAC relate to design, the ESP and COL will each 
contain ITAAC. 
 110.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.73 (2011) (noting the applicant’s opportunity to reference an 
ESP or a Standard Design in its COL application); id. at § 52.8 (noting that applicants may 
combine in order to avoid taking repetitive steps). 
 111.  See, e.g., Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined 
Licenses for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372, 15,376 (Apr. 18, 1989) (noting 
the predictability fostered by the new licensing scheme). 
 112.  E.g., Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 49,352, 49,368 (Aug. 28, 2007) (noting the efficiency advantages of early resolution 
and finality of issues). 
 113.  Compare 10 C.F.R. § 52.79 (2011) (setting forth the technical specifications 
required under the new licensing process), with id. § 50.34 (setting forth the technical 
specifications required under the old licensing process). 
 114.  See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (setting forth the 
mandatory hearing requirement for commercial nuclear power generation licenses); see also 
10 C.F.R. § 52.85 (2011) (setting forth the location of the procedural regulations to be 
applied in the mandatory hearing proceedings). 
 115.  See Changes to Adjudicatory Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 2,182, 2,182 (Jan. 14, 2004) 
(“The [NRC] is amending its regulations . . . to make the NRC’s hearing process more 
effective and efficient.”). The NRC continued: “The final rule will fashion hearing 
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NRC published a final rule in which reactor licensing hearings were to be 
conducted in a less trial-type manner (pursuant to Subpart L) than those 
required under the old protocol.116 Under the new process, in addition to 
granting parties to a proceeding fewer discovery and cross examination 
rights, the agency raised the bar for hopeful intervenors to gain standing 
and submit contentions.117 In stark contrast to the Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Appeal Board’s liberal Allens Creek decision under the old 
process discussed in Part II.A,118 the ASLB is taking a much harder line in 
interpreting the standards for intervening and submitting contentions in the 
mandatory informal hearings under Part 52: “[O]ur contention admissibility 
‘requirements are deliberately strict, and we will reject any contention that 
does not satisfy’ them.”119 While potential intervenors undoubtedly face a 
higher standard for participating in a Part 52 combined license mandatory 
hearing, the new informal procedures have been judicially challenged and 
upheld as consistent with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure 
Act,120 albeit with some hesitation.121 
In addition to the revamped mandatory hearing process, an 
application for a COL must also contain ITAAC.122 The closure of each 
                                                                                                                 
procedures that are tailored to the differing types of licensing and regulatory activities . . . 
and will better focus the limited resources of involved parties and the NRC.” Id. 
 116.  See id. (setting forth more efficient hearing procedures for nuclear reactor 
licensing proceedings). Compare 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, subpart L (2010) (setting forth a 
streamlined hearing process characterized by a system of mandatory disclosure, see id. at 
§ 2.336, restricted cross-examination rights, see id. at § 2.1204, and interrogation by the 
presiding officer rather than the litigants, see id. at § 2.1207), with 10 C.F.R. pt. 2 subpart G 
(1980) (setting forth the formal adjudicatory hearing process characterized by trial-type 
procedures such as full discovery and direct and cross examination by the parties to the 
proceeding). 
 117.  See Changes to Adjudicatory Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 2,182, 2,202 (Jan. 14, 2004) 
(“The requirement to have specific contentions with a supporting statement of the facts 
alleged or expert opinion that provides the bases for them in all hearings should focus 
litigation on concrete issues and result in a clearer and more focused record for decision.”). 
 118.  See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (noting the appeal board’s liberal 
interpretation of the standard for petitions for leave to intervene and the standard for 
submitting contentions). 
 119.  See S. C. Elec. & Gas Co., Nos. 52–027, 52–028, 2010 WL 4057454, at *3 
(N.R.C., Aug. 27, 2010) (affirming the 2010 ASLB decision denying the petition to 
intervene and submit a contention that asserted the applicants “inadequately addressed the 
need for power, energy alternatives, and costs and schedule for the proposed reactors”). 
 120.  See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (2011) (setting forth 
the federal law governing procedure within administrative agencies).  
 121.  See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 351 (1st Cir. 
2004) (“Though the Commission’s new rules may approach the outer bounds of what is 
permissible under the APA, we find the statute sufficiently broad to accommodate them.”). 
 122.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.80 (2011) (setting forth the fact that a COL application must 
contain ITAAC that if performed and met will demonstrate that a plant has been constructed 
and will operate in conformity with the COL and all relevant statues and regulations). Recall 
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ITAAC will serve as the condition that a facility must meet before the 
agency will authorize a licensee to load fuel and operate; in other words, the 
closed ITAAC will provide the agency reasonable assurance that the facility 
conformed with the combined license in the construction process and will 
be operated accordingly.123 A single application might contain several 
hundred ITAAC, and some have well over a thousand that the applicant 
must perform and the agency must approve.124 After the mandatory 
combined license hearing, the Commission must identify all ITAAC125 
prior to granting the combined license.126 Upon issuing a COL, the 
Commission may find that certain ESP and design certification ITAAC 
have been met. Such a finding will resolve those ITAAC with finality, and 
they will be deemed closed.127  
An applicant, having obtained a COL and identified the “open” 
ITAAC, has the green light from the agency to commence construction,128 
analogous to the position of a licensee holding a construction permit under 
the old process. Plant construction will likely take several years, and the 
ITAAC closure phase is ongoing throughout this period.129 During this 
                                                                                                                 
that early site permit and design certification applications also must contain ITAAC. See 
supra note 18 for a thorough definition of ITAAC. 
 123.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.103(g) (2011) (setting forth the procedure for closure within 
the preoperational ITAAC review process). 
 124.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Luis A. Reyes, NRC Exec. Dir. of Operations on 
Policy of Staff Approach to Verifying the Closure of ITAAC to the Comm’rs (Mar. 8, 2007) 
(on file with the author). Note that a COL incorporates the ITAAC of the early site permit 
and design certification. Most ITAAC are in fact defined in the design certification review 
process, so a significant number were identified previously and are merely incorporated by 
reference in a COL. 
 125.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.97(b) (2010) (“The Commission shall identify the . . . [ITAAC] 
that, if met, are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the facility has 
been constructed and will be operated in conformity with the license, the provisions of the 
Act, and the Commission’s rules and regulations.”). 
 126.  See id. § 52.103 (noting the steps that must take place in order to obtain 
authorization to operate under a combined license). 
 127.  See id. § 52.97(a)(2) (“[T]hose acceptance criteria have been met . . . [and] will be 
deemed to be excluded from the combined license, and [further findings] with respect to 
those acceptance criteria are unnecessary.”). 
 128.  See, e.g., id. § 50.10 (noting that no person may begin construction of a facility 
prior to obtaining a COL); see also id. § 52.1 (setting forth the definition of a combined 
license as a “combined construction permit and operating license with conditions for a 
nuclear power facility,” which implicitly suggests the COL authorizes the licensee to begin 
construction (emphasis added)). Note that the conditions referred to are the ITAAC, which 
will become technical requirements identified by the Commission when it issues the 
combined license. See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text (describing what happens 
with proposed ITAAC when the Commission issues a combined license). 
 129.  See id. § 52.99(c)(1) (“The licensee shall notify the NRC that the prescribed 
inspections, tests, and analyses have been performed and that the prescribed acceptance 
criteria have been met. The notification must contain sufficient information to demonstrate 
[as much].”). 
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time, the licensee is to submit status updates informing the agency when 
prescribed inspections, tests, and analyses have been performed and that the 
acceptance criteria have been met (i.e., the company is responsible for 
seeing to it that each ITAAC is met and also for providing the agency with 
notice of a basis for how the closure took place sufficient for NRC 
review).130 It is the duty of the agency to ensure there was in fact 
conformance and to publish notice of completion when appropriate.131 
Under section 52.103, the licensee must notify the agency 
approximately nine months prior to the scheduled date for loading fuel; the 
agency is then required to publish a notice of intent to operate and provide 
that “any person whose interest may be affected by operation of the plant 
may . . . request a hearing on whether the facility as constructed complies, 
or on completion will comply, with the acceptance criteria in the combined 
license,” excepting ITAAC that have already been met under 
section 52.97(a)(2).132 The regulations set forth a high threshold and narrow 
scope for obtaining a hearing at this stage:133 It must be shown that one or 
more of the acceptance criteria in the ITAAC have not or will not be met 
and that the consequences of such failure will result in the inability of the 
agency to provide reasonable assurance of the public health and safety.134 
Absent specific facts (rather than general, subjective concerns), there is no 
basis for intervention and no grounds for a post-construction hearing.135 
However, unlike the streamlined mandatory hearing that took place at the 
COL stage,136 if the Commission grants a section 52.103(a) hearing, it has 
discretion to conduct it under the informal adjudicatory process of Subpart 
L or the formal adjudicatory process set forth in Subpart G.137 A licensee 
                                                 
 130.  See id. § 52.99(a) (requiring licensees to submit notifications that implementation 
has occurred and in six month intervals during the construction phase). 
 131.  See id. § 52.99(e) (setting forth the agency’s duty to inspect and notify the public). 
 132.  See id. § 52.103(a) (noting the requirements that the agency provide notice and 
opportunity for a hearing prior to allowing operation under a combined license). This 
provision also requires that a party who successfully requests a hearing shall be admitted as 
a party to that hearing. Id. 
 133.  See § 2.309 (explaining the procedure for hearings and petitions to intervene and 
the requirements for standing and contentions); see also supra notes 115–121 and 
accompanying text (setting forth the more efficient process under the new regulations, along 
with the heightened threshold for intervention).   
 134.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.103(b) (2011) (describing the requirements that must be shown 
to request and become a party to a section 52.103(a) hearing). 
 135.  See id. (requiring specificity in a petition to intervene at this stage, particularly 
with regard the specific consequences of alleged nonconformance). 
 136.  See id. § 2.310(a) (stating that combined license hearings may be conducted 
pursuant to the streamlined procedures set forth in Subpart L). 
 137.  See id. §§ 52.103(d), 2.310(j) (noting the Commission’s discretion in choosing 
informal or formal adjudication if a section 52.103(a) hearing is granted). Note that all 
relevant hearings under the old two-step process proceeded according to the formal 
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cannot operate a nuclear power generation facility until the Commission 
makes a section 103(g) finding that all acceptance criteria in the combined 
license have been met, and once that finding has been made, “all ITAAC 
expire upon final Commission action in the proceeding.”138 
Pause to consider the position of a licensee at this stage, by way of 
contrast with the licensee who had just submitted an application for an 
operating license under the two-step process, particularly in terms of the 
investment spent and risk ahead.139 Whereas the agency conducted 
significant quality assurance review during the operating license 
proceedings under the old process, that role will take place continually 
under the Part 52 regulations, throughout the construction phase.  As the 
apparent analog to the high-risk, uncertain, inefficient operating license 
proceeding, it becomes clear that this novel and untested ITAAC review 
process will be the significant ground upon which the new process’s 
success in curing the defects of the two-step will be evaluated. While the 
Part 52 regulations were first published over two decades ago, this process 
is just now facing its defining moment. 
 
2.  Why the Delay? The Enabling Legislation 
 
Before turning to an assessment of how the new process is 
functioning in its nascent stage, a brief discussion of the legislation 
supporting the new licensing scheme is warranted (in addition to the 
Atomic Energy Act).140 The new regulations were first published in 1989; 
however, combined license applications under Part 52 did not start flowing 
into the NRC until 2007.141 Why the delay? Even after the NRC 
                                                                                                                 
adjudicatory procedures set forth in the old Subpart G, where broader discovery and cross-
examination rights were recognized, among other things. 
 138.  See id. § 52.103(g), (h) (declaring that a finding that all ITAAC are met is a 
prerequisite to operating a facility and that once that finding is official the ITAAC expire, no 
longer serving as regulatory requirements since the technical aspects have been met). 
 139.  See supra Part II.B (setting forth the position of a hypothetical licensee at the 
operating license application stage under the old bifurcated regulatory scheme and detailing 
the defects of the Part 50 licensing regulations). Note the narrow scope that might be at issue 
in a hearing at this phase under Part 52, the ability to predict, and the amount of control the 
licensee has over abating the risk of the Commission granting a contested hearing, in 
comparison with an operating license hearing under Part 50.  
 140.  See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text (describing the organic statute of 
the Atomic Energy Commission, NRC’s predecessor). 
 141.  See NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., NEW NUCLEAR PLANT STATUS, 
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/graphicsandcharts/newnucl
earplantstatus/ (last updated Jan. 2011) (displaying the NRC combined licensing applicants 
and relevant application information in chart form) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
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implemented its efficiency-enhancing regulations,142 economic 
considerations continued to be an obstacle to initiating new nuclear 
projects.143 
 The NRC had limited tools at its disposal to create an environment 
conducive to stimulating investment in nuclear development given that its 
role was not that of an economic regulator.144 Recognizing the need for 
government support of expanding the nuclear energy industry, Congress 
passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the “Act”).145 Several provisions 
applicable to the nuclear industry set forth economic incentives that have 
been serving as the long-awaited impetus to get firms to invest in the new 
nuclear power industry. 
First, the loan guarantee program supports innovative nuclear 
technology and guarantees that the Secretary of Energy will cover up to 
eighty percent of project cost for investment in technology that reduces 
carbon emissions.146 Second, the production tax credit allows the Secretary 
of Treasury to permit a 1.8 cents per kilowatt-hour tax credit to qualified 
nuclear facilities that may be in effect for up to eight years once a facility 
begins to operate.147 Third, the “Standby Support” provision allows the 
Secretary of Energy to enter into contracts to cover delays related to this 
generation’s early reactors, including delays caused by failure of the NRC 
to comply with inspection, review, and hearing schedules, along with 
                                                 
 142.  See supra note 115 (noting the 2004 amendments promulgated to streamline the 
hearing process). 
 143.  See SCULLY CAPITAL, BUSINESS CASE FOR NEW NUCLEAR REACTORS 11 (Oct. 1, 
2002), available at http://www.ne.doe.gov/home/bc/ExecOverviewNERAC100102.pdf 
(recognizing in 2002 that early plant capital costs are so high that government assistance 
might be necessary to finance nuclear projects). 
 144.  See The Commission, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organization/commfuncdesc.html (last visited April 16, 2012) 
(“The Commission as a collegial body formulates policies, develops regulations governing 
nuclear reactor and nuclear material safety, issues orders to licensees, and adjudicates legal 
matters.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 145.  See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 595 (mostly 
codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Energy Policy Act] 
(setting forth Congress’ comprehensive legislative effort to address escalating energy 
problems); see also SCULLY CAPITAL, supra note 143, at 4 (noting the market context and 
suggesting the environmental and energy advantages of nuclear power). 
 146.  See Energy Policy Act, supra note 145, §§ 1701–04 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 16,511–16,514) (setting forth the Act’s loan guarantee provision for innovative energy 
technology). 
 147.  See id. § 1306 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45J) (setting forth the tax credit for 
production from advanced nuclear power facilities). Note that to be eligible for this tax 
credit, the COL must have been submitted prior to 2009, the plant must be under 
construction by 2014, and it must be operating by 2021. Id. 
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litigation delays.148 These provisions, among others, comprise the enabling 
legislation that has set this nuclear renaissance in motion. Next, this Note 
will provide observations of the new licensing scheme in its infancy. 
 
3.  The Test Case: Plant Vogtle 
 
The scene at Southern Company’s Vogtle site in eastern Georgia is 
a sight to behold: Steam billows from Vogtle Units 1 and 2 in the 
background on the 3,100-acre site along the Savannah River, where the 
sound of heavy machinery is in the air and nearly two thousand contractors 
and other employees are working—at desks in trailers and in bulldozers that 
move dirt around two massive holes (each the size of five football fields) in 
an area that has been cleared and excavated pursuant to the limited work 
authorization filed in conjunction with the ESP application.149 This is all in 
preparation for the construction of Plant Vogtle’s anticipated third and 
fourth nuclear reactors, which may begin once the NRC issues what many 
expect to be the very first Part 52 combined construction and operating 
license.150 Southern Company expects to receive approval of their 
combined license later this year.151 
With Vogtle leading the way, the new licensing scheme seems to be 
functioning smoothly so far: Southern Company was able to obtain an early 
site permit and limited work authorization and to incorporate by reference 
                                                 
 148.  See id. § 638 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16041) (setting forth the Act’s Standby 
Support provision for certain nuclear plant delays). This provision provides that the 
Department of Energy will pay 100% of covered costs for the first two reactors that have 
received a combined license under Part 52 and for which construction has begun. It will 
provide 50% coverage for the next four reactors that meet the same requirements.   
 149.  See supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text (discussing the regulatory vehicle 
known as the limited work authorization); see also Southern Nuclear Operating Company’s 
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant ESP Site, Early Site Permit and Limited Work 
Authorization, No. 52–011, ESP–004 (Aug. 26, 2009), available at 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0922/ML092290157.pdf (setting forth the details of the 
ESP and LWA for Southern Company’s Vogtle site, including accompanying ITAAC in 
Appendix E). 
 150.  See Pavey, supra note 29 (“Although site preparation is under way for the $14.5 
billion project, work on the reactors cannot begin until the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission issues the combined license authorizing both the construction and operation of 
the units.”).   
 151.  See Milestones, SOUTHERN COMPANY, 
http://www.southerncompany.com/nuclearenergy/milestones.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 
2011) (setting forth the timeline of the Vogtle project thus far, along with anticipated 
milestones) (on file with the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Author’s 
note: Approval of the COL was granted on February 9, 2012, allowing full construction to 
commence. See Press Release, Southern Company, Southern Company Subsidiary Receives 
Historic License Approval for New Vogtle Units, Full Construction Set to Begin (Feb. 9, 
2012), available at 
http://www.southerncompany.com/nuclearenergy/presskit/docs/COL_press_release.pdf. 
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applications for the Vogtle ESP and an amendment to a standard design 
certification within its COL application, all within a three year span.152  
Southern Company also secured a conditional $8.3 million loan guarantee 
for the Vogtle units pursuant to the loan guarantee program set forth in the 
Energy Policy Act.153   
In addition to the apparent functioning from industry’s perspective, 
it seems the regulatory framework is providing adequate opportunity for 
public participation at this stage, despite the expressed hard line regarding 
interventions and contentions.154 Consider the Vogtle COL proceeding in 
which several joint petitioners sought to intervene, relying on three separate 
contentions.155 After granting standing to the joint petitioners,156 the ASLB 
rejected two of the three contentions for failure to meet the pleading 
requirements157 and admitted the third as a contention of omission.158 This 
ruling suggests two things—first, the public still appears to have a legally 
sufficient opportunity to participate in these proceedings, and second, this is 
so despite the board’s strict construction of the procedural rules, unlike the 
ASLB in the 1970s and 1980s that essentially interpreted the Part 2 
intervention procedures out of the rule.159 
Even so, the new licensing scheme is about to be put to the test. 
Currently, the NRC has issued four early site permits and has two other 
                                                 
 152.  See id. (noting the ESP was filed in August 2006 and granted in August 2009, with 
all other events transpiring in the interim). 
 153.  See, e.g., Peter Behr, DOE Delivers Its First, Long-Awaited Nuclear Loan 
Guarantee, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/02/17/17climatewire-doe-delivers-its-first-long-
awaited-nuclear-71731.html?pagewanted=all (announcing the first loan guarantee obtained 
by Southern Company for its Vogtle units). 
 154.  See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the agency’s heightened 
threshold for granting petitions to intervene in the informal adjudicatory process). 
 155.  See S. Nuclear Operating Co., 69 N.R.C. 139, 167, 2009 WL 3812209 (2009) 
(holding that the joint petitioners established standing to intervene and put forth one 
sufficient contention to grant them party status in the proceeding).   
 156.  See id. at 150–51 (granting standing to each individual petitioners that filed the 
joint petition to intervene). 
 157.  See id. at 155 (finding the contentions related to the Westinghouse design 
revisions “inadmissible in that these contentions and their foundational support [have] failed 
to proffer a specific, sufficiently supported, material issue regarding a safety concern 
associated with the interaction between the pending [design revisions and the COL 
application]”). 
 158.  See id. at 160 (holding that the safety contention is “admitted in that this 
contention and its foundational support are sufficient to establish a genuine material dispute 
adequate to warrant further inquiry”). 
 159.  See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text (noting the ASLB’s 
interpretation of the procedural rules under Part 52 proceedings thus far); see also N. States 
Power Co., 68 N.R.C. 905, 912 (2008) (granting the petition for intervention but only after a 
strict reading of the procedural requirements required to intervene and a supplemental 
affidavit submitted by petitioners to satisfy the procedural requirements). 
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applications under review;160 it has issued four design certifications and has 
six others under review (including one renewal application);161 and it has 
eighteen applications for a combined license covering a total of twenty-
seven reactors under agency review.162 While Southern Company’s Vogtle 
units are predicted to lead the way, other applicants are moving forward as 
well.163 All of this activity begs the question, Will the Part 52 regulations 
provide adequate public participation and a sufficiently stable framework to 
carry this fleet forward? Next, this Note discusses the problems that must 
be addressed to ensure this generation of nuclear facilities will avoid the 
fate of the precedent fleet, in which, for example, the Shoreham project 
went under even before reaching the fuel loading stage.164 
 
III.  Weathering the Storm: Challenges Facing the New Fleet of Reactors 
 
 The quality assurance review that largely took place during the Part 
50 operating license proceeding will substantially occur in the pre-
operational ITAAC review process of the new licensing scheme. A hopeful 
licensee includes all necessary ITAAC in each application submitted to the 
NRC staff, which in turn will define the ITAAC in the combined license, 
either for the first time or by way of reference to ITAAC in the early site 
                                                 
 160.  See Early Site Permit Applications for New Reactors, NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/esp.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2011) 
(listing the Vogtle, Clinton, Grand Gulf, and North Anna as approved sites and the Victoria 
and PSEG sites as under review) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment).  
 161.  See Design Certification Applications for New Reactors, NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert.html (last visited Nov. 17, 
2011 ) (listing the ABWR, System 80+, AP600, and AP1000 as approved design 
certifications and several other designs as currently under review) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 162.  See Combined License Applications for New Reactors, NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2011) 
(listing the reactors having pending COL applications currently before the NRC, along with 
the Calloway Plant, for which application review was suspended in June 2009) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). These reactors 
are Bell Bend, Bellefonte (2), Calvert Cliffs, Comanche Peak (2), Fermi, Grand Gulf, Levy 
County (2), Nine Mile Point, North Anna, River Bend Station, Shearon Harris (2), South 
Texas (2), Turkey Point (2), Victoria County Station (2), Virgil C. Summer (2), Vogtle (2), 
and William States Lee III (2). Id. 
 163.  See, e.g., S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., [CLI-10-21] (denying remaining portion of 
intervention petition and terminating the contested portion of the Virgil C. Summer COL 
proceeding). Note that the COL application for this nuclear power facility did not utilize the 
limited work authorization, nor did it incorporate by reference an early site permit, by way 
of contrast with the manner Southern Company proceeded under Part 52 for its Vogtle plant. 
 164.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the final projects that went 
under in the context of the two-step licensing process). 
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permit and standard design certification.165 Section 52.1 defines a combined 
license as “a combined construction permit and operating license with 
conditions for a nuclear power facility . . . .”166 The license is conditioned 
upon a licensee performing the hundreds or even thousands of pre-
defined167 inspections, tests, and analyses and an agency finding that the 
licensee has in fact met all pre-defined acceptance criteria, which together 
will provide the basis for the agency’s determination that it does or does not 
have reasonable assurance the plant will be safely operated in conformance 
with the COL.168 From the moment construction begins, each licensee will 
have the blueprint for exactly what it must do to obtain agency approval to 
begin operating, as described in each individual ITAAC. The efficiency and 
predictability advantages seem obvious when compared to the two-step 
process in which construction permit holders designed as they built (with 
no comparable blueprint to guide them) and were subject to a quality 
assurance evaluation with near unlimited scope and somewhat 
unpredictable evaluation criteria in the operating license proceedings.169 
Prior to gaining approval to operate under Part 52, the public has an 
opportunity to request a hearing; however, the regulations define the scope 
of these proceedings very narrowly and require a showing that specific 
ITAAC have not and will not be met and that such failure precludes a 
finding that there is reasonable assurance of the public health and safety.170 
On its face, it might appear the regulatory scheme provides for a seamless 
process that will provide stability for this nuclear renaissance to charge 
forward. 
 However, two significant and interlocking issues stand in the way. 
First, the ITAAC closure process and maintenance period (likely to span 
several years) proceed without public participation until the section 103(a) 
hearing opportunity presents itself toward the very end of the construction 
phase.171 Under certain factual circumstances, the text of the provision 
                                                 
 165.  See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing the how the ITAAC are 
defined in the combined construction and operating license). 
 166.  10 C.F.R. § 52.1 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 167.  These ITAAC are pre-defined in the COL. 
 168.  See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting that the closed ITAAC provide 
the NRC staff with the basis for a finding of reasonable assurance that a nuclear facility will 
be operated safely and in accordance with the license). 
 169.  See supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting the uncertainty of design at this 
stage of the process under Part 50). 
 170.  See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text (setting forth the two strict prima 
facie requirements that are necessary for the agency to grant a request for a section 103(a) 
hearing). 
 171.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.99 (2011) (describing the ITAAC closure process, which 
consists of detailed reporting on the part of licensees to provide a sufficient basis to ensure 
the agency that the ITAAC have been met, but which does not provide for public 
participation aside from the agency’s duty to publish notices of the closed ITAAC).  
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setting forth the pre-operational ITAAC hearing is internally contradictory 
and legally impermissible on two separate grounds, discussed in Part III.A. 
Further, the regulations do not conclusively settle what precise procedures 
will be used in these section 103(a) ITAAC review hearings,172 leaving 
open the question of whether or not these proceedings will be legally 
permissible under the Administrative Procedure Act.173   
Second, while design standardization has significantly improved, 
these projects will last several years, and during this time design and other 
changes will be inevitable.174 While the regulations provide a mechanism 
for altering a site characteristic or design parameter that does not trigger 
significant procedural requirements, this is only available if the variance is 
granted prior to the issuance of a combined license.175 Once a COL is 
issued, any change requires an amendment, which triggers a hearing 
opportunity.176 With the hearing opportunity that arises with each 
amendment, this tranche of reactors is facing an effective reversion to the 
hearing delays and cost-escalation problems that characterized the two-step 
process. And activity under Part 52 thus far suggests that amendments will 
in fact be sought: Westinghouse, the company that designed one of the four 
standard design certifications issued to date by the NRC, currently has its 
amended AP1000 reactor design under agency review and submitted its 
eighteenth revision to that amendment late last year.177 Even though the 
interplay that will occur between these issues will be significant, for 
                                                 
 172.  See id. § 52.103(e), (f), (g) (referring generally to the “Commission” in setting 
forth the section 103(a) hearing procedures and leaving the decision of whether to choose a 
formal or informal adjudicatory hearing procedure at the discretion of the “Commission”).  
 173.  See, e.g., Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act § 4 
(1947) (prepared by the United States Department of Justice Tom Clark, Attorney General) 
(noting the requirements set forth in section 5(b) for a certain level of public participation for 
interested parties in all administrative adjudicatory proceedings). 
 174.  These design and other changes will also have implications in the ITAAC review 
process, as any alteration will likely require a change to the blueprint, the predefined ITAAC 
set forth in the COL, hence the interlocking nature of these two issues. 
 175.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.93(c) (2011) (allowing an applicant to seek a variance to which 
the Commission will apply the same criteria as if it had been in the original application so 
long as the variance is obtained prior to the issuance of a combined license). 
 176.  See id. § 52.98(f) (“Any modification to, addition to, or deletion from the terms 
and conditions of a combined license, including any modification to, addition to, or deletion 
from the [ITAAC] contained in the license is a proposed amendment to the license. There 
must be an opportunity for a hearing on the amendment.” (emphases added)). 
 177.  See Robynne Boyd, Safety Concerns Delay Approval of the First U.S. Nuclear 
Reactor in Decades, SCI. AM., July 29, 2010 (noting that the amendment to the AP1000 
reactor design was on its eighteenth revision); see also Design Certification Application 
Review, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-
cert/amended-ap1000.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) (stating that Westinghouse submitted 
its eighteenth revision to the NRC on December 1, 2010) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
NEW NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION 299 
 
discussion purposes, this Note addresses the issues associated with the 
ITAAC review process and amendments in turn. 
 
A.  Public Participation in the ITAAC Process: Definition, Implementation, 
and Closeout 
 
 While ITAAC are defined (and redefined) throughout the early site 
permit, design certification, and combined license application proceedings 
(and beyond), the period in which the agency may begin to issue findings 
that ITAAC have been met (the “closeout” phase) does not begin until the 
combined license is issued.178 As a result, the manner in which ITAAC 
closeout will function in reality remains to be determined since the agency 
has not yet issued a COL; however, that phase is imminent, as the agency 
grant of the COL in connection with Southern Company’s Vogtle Units 3 
and 4 is predicted to take place later this year.179 Essentially, the closeout 
phase will be finalized with the agency’s section 103(g) finding and 
subsequent termination of the proceeding, which will serve as the final 
regulatory step before loading fuel under Part 52.180 This step is analogous 
to the issuance of an operating license under the bifurcated licensing 
scheme and similarly serves as the last step to ensure reasonable assurance 
that the operating plant will not endanger the public’s health and safety.181 
In short, the stakes of getting the pre-operational ITAAC review process 
right are high. 
 Consider the lifespan of a single hypothetical ITAAC contained in 
an early site permit:182 First, the applicant must set forth the proposed 
ITAAC in its application;183 at the conclusion of the proceeding the agency 
                                                 
 178.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.97(a)(2) (2011) (setting forth the first time the NRC may issue 
a finding regarding ITAAC, which is when it issues a combined license, at which time it 
may close ITAAC related to an early site permit or a standard design certification that was 
referenced in the COL application). The agency may close the ITAAC if the closure is 
warranted. Id. 
 179.  See, e.g., James M. Hylko, Plant Vogtle Leads the Next Nuclear Generation, 
POWER MAG., Nov. 1, 2009, at 2, available at 
http://www.powermag.com/issues/features/Plant-Vogtle-Leads-the-Next-Nuclear-
Generation_2247_p2.html (“The NRC has scheduled completion of the Vogtle final safety 
evaluation report in April 2011. Southern Nuclear expects to receive its COL later in 2011 
and then immediately begin safety-related construction.”). 
 180.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.103(g) (2011) (stating that a facility shall not operate until a 
finding under this section is made, implying that this is the final step before loading fuel). 
 181.  See id. § 50.57 (providing agency authorization for a facility to begin operating 
upon issuance of a license under this subsection). 
 182.  Assume for the purposes of this hypothetical that the early site permit will be 
granted and later incorporated by reference into the applicant’s combined license, which will 
also be granted. 
 183.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.17(b)(3) (2011) (“Emergency plans submitted under . . . this 
section must include the proposed [ITAAC].”).   
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will issue an early site permit if it finds the applicant’s proposed ITAAC is 
necessary and sufficient to ensure reasonable assurance of conformance 
with the ESP (and thus public health and safety);184 with the defined 
ITAAC serving as an applicant’s blueprint for that particular component, 
the applicant will be responsible for implementing it as prescribed and then 
reporting as much to the agency “with sufficient information to demonstrate 
that the [ITAAC has] been met;”185 with this information the agency has the 
duty to ensure proper implementation186 and to make a finding that the 
acceptance criteria has been met;187 finally, the agency will close the 
ITAAC upon a section 103(g) finding and final commission action in the 
proceeding, at which point the ITAAC will expire.188 
To date, it appears the new regulatory scheme provides adequate, 
albeit more limited, opportunity for public participation through the 
combined license proceeding stage (that is, the procedures are in 
conformance with the APA).189 But what about the pre-operational ITAAC 
review process? In the hypothetical set forth above, an opportunity to 
request a hearing is only available at two junctures.190 First, it is available 
during the definitional phase (which is finalized upon issuance of an early 
site permit, standard design certification, or combined license depending on 
the ITAAC),191 and second, during the closure phase, which consists of a 
final finding that the ITAAC has been met and takes place either upon 
                                                 
 184.  See id. § 52.24(a)(5) (noting that agency approval of the applicant’s proposed 
ITAAC is necessary for the issuance of an early site permit). 
 185.  Id. § 52.99(c)(1). 
 186.  See id. § 52.99(e) (“The NRC shall ensure that the prescribed inspections, tests, 
and analyses in the ITAAC are performed.”). 
 187.  See id. § 52.103(g) (noting the Commission finding (a “section 103(g) finding”) 
that the ITAAC has been met is a prerequisite to operating a facility). 
 188.  See id. § 52.103(g), (h) (describing how an official agency finding that the ITAAC 
has been met causes the ITAAC to expire, which means it no longer constitutes a regulatory 
requirement for licensees while operating or seeking license renewal). Note that this finding 
may also take place when the agency issues a COL, and such a finding has a similar effect, 
in that the ITAAC expires and essentially no longer exists. Id. § 52.97(a)(2). 
 189.  See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text (describing the apparent adequate 
opportunity for public participation under Part 52 thus far, at this admittedly early stage); see 
also supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text (noting judicial approval of the new 
administrative procedures in response to an APA challenge). 
 190.  For explanatory purposes, this hypothetical does not account for the possibility of 
amendments, which will also trigger an opportunity to request a hearing. In reality, these 
issues will be intertwined. This Note discusses amendments separately in Part III.B, supra. 
 191.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.24(b) (noting that all terms and conditions of an early site 
permit, including ITAAC, have been met or will serve as conditions of a combined license 
and are thus defined); see also id. § 52.54(b) (noting that all requirements must be specified 
when the standard design certification is issued); id. § 52.97(b) (noting the same for issuance 
of a combined license). 
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issuance of a combined license192 or with a section 103(g) finding.193 The 
fact that the scope of these proceedings is limited is not problematic in and 
of itself.194 However, in current form, when certain factual circumstances 
present themselves the regulations become inherently contradictory and 
therefore violative of the policy imperative set forth in the agency’s own 
organic statute, rendering the regulation ultra vires.195 The hypothetical 
helps illustrate exactly why section 52.103 is inconsistent with the NRC’s 
organic statute. Suppose the agency adopts the ITAAC definition proposed 
by the applicant when it issues the early site permit, the proceeding goes 
forward uncontested, the COL (referencing the early site permit including 
this ITAAC) has been issued, and plant construction is underway. Suppose 
further that a member of the public discovers that the ITAAC is materially 
flawed—that the performed inspections, tests, and analyses would not in 
fact provide reasonable assurance of the public health and safety, even if 
the acceptance criteria were met. The requirements to request a section 
103(a) hearing would bar the interested party from even making such a 
request, if strictly construed: a prima facie showing that the ITAAC has not 
or will not be met and the specific, harmful operational consequences that 
will result is not possible under this hypothetical.196 In other words, a strict 
application of the procedural requirements set forth in the regulations, 
which also state that interested parties must be afforded the opportunity to 
request a hearing, preclude a party from requesting a hearing since they 
cannot make a prima facie showing that the ITAAC has not and will not be 
met. So undiscovered safety issues, which (quite obviously) were not 
addressed in the (flawed) ITAAC definition phase, cannot be challenged so 
long as the applicant adequately performs the defined inspections, tests, and 
analyses, meets the defined acceptance criteria, and the agency finds 
conformance therewith.197   
                                                 
 192.  See id. § 52.97(a)(2) (describing the process for closing ITAAC when the COL 
issues, which similarly “will finally resolve that those [ITAAC] have been met, [and] those 
acceptance criteria will be deemed to be excluded from the combined license” and further 
findings with respect to those ITAAC are unnecessary). 
 193.  See supra notes 188, 192, and accompanying text (describing when official 
ITAAC closure and expiration takes place). 
 194.  See supra notes 119–121 (noting the strict admissibility requirements set forth in 
the regulations and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board’s strict interpretation of those 
requirements). This statement is speculative to a degree; however, if the ASLB is consistent 
in its procedural interpretation, these later hearings will be subject to the same strict scrutiny 
that has been consistently applied in the proceedings to date. 
 195.  See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2011) (setting forth 
Congress’s intent in passing the Act, notably its goal that the use of nuclear power be 
directed at improving the general welfare).  
 196.  See supra note 134 and accompanying text (setting forth the standards required for 
requesting a hearing).   
 197.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.103(g) (2011) (stating that a closure for a specific ITAAC 
requires only a finding that the pre-defined acceptance criteria have been met). 
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In the event that an attentive member of the public uncovers a 
materially flawed ITAAC definition phase, the regulation’s procedural 
structure precludes the interested party from exercising the right to request 
a hearing granted explicitly in section 103(a) by the procedural 
requirements in section 103(b). Sections 103(a) and (b) are inherently 
contradictory under a certain, probable fact pattern (as was the case in the 
hypothetical just described).198 Taking the hypothetical one step further, 
suppose the materially flawed ITAAC, if uncorrected, might cause 
substantial safety hazards to the community surrounding a generation 
facility. Under these circumstances, the regulatory procedures are legally 
impermissible in at least two ways. First, a strict interpretation of section 
103(b) will lead the agency to authorize plant operation when operation will 
cause significant and detrimental health and safety consequences that will 
be harmful to the general welfare in violation of the agency’s organic 
statute.199 
Second, the current regulation is structured to accommodate due 
process violations against individual litigants. Agency adjudication carries 
with it constitutional due process hearing rights.200 Suppose the agency does 
not allow a hearing on the flawed ITAAC based on the interested party’s 
failure to meet the prima facie requirements necessary to request a hearing, 
resulting in the termination of a proceeding and the nuclear facility going 
on line. The applicable due process framework was set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly.201 The interested party would have a 
cause of action if it could show that, on balance, (1) the agency action has 
caused some substantial deprivation to the interested party resulting from 
failure to consider the materially flawed ITAAC in the proceeding, (2) the 
governmental interest in not allowing the hearing was minimal, and (3) the 
risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest involved resulting from the 
procedure (not) used was a near certainty and, along the same line, that 
                                                 
 198.   See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text (setting forth the strict prima 
facie requirements necessary for the agency to grant a request for an ITAAC hearing and the 
admission requirements once a hearing is granted).  
 199.  See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2011) (“[T]he development, 
use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote world peace, improve 
the general welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free competition in 
private enterprise.”). 
 200.  See, e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental 
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”). 
 201.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (articulating a three-part balancing 
framework to determine whether a procedural due process violation has occurred when 
benefits were terminated without notice or a hearing and holding that such violation did in 
fact occur).  
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additional procedural safeguards would have had substantial value in 
protecting the interest at stake.202 
In addition to these legal problems, other issues will likely surface. 
The applicant is at the helm throughout the ITAAC implementation 
phase.203 With no required agency oversight and no comparable, explicit 
role for members of the public, assurance of compliance with each ITAAC 
is based almost entirely on the information submitted by the applicant to the 
agency to demonstrate that the applicant complied.204 Similarly, the 
regulations grant the agency discretion in choosing whether to conduct a 
section 103(a) hearing according to formal or informal adjudicatory 
procedures.205 While this is not necessarily legally problematic, the manner 
in which these proceedings are conducted will certainly be subject to close 
scrutiny to ensure the processes adopted comply with the procedural 
requirements set forth in the APA. In its decision in Citizens Awareness 
Network, Inc.,206 the First Circuit sent a strong message to the agency in 
particular: “Should the agency’s administration of the new rules contradict 
its present representations or other wise flout [the APA’s principles], 
nothing in this opinion will inoculate the rules against future challenges.”207 
 
B. Responding to Change in a Frontloaded Regulatory Scheme 
 
 Under the bifurcated licensing scheme, most questions remained 
unanswered until the licensee was ready to load fuel.208 With the lessons 
from the generation of plants licensed under Part 50, the agency retooled by 
moving major decisions to the beginning of the process, limiting procedural 
formality of licensing proceedings, and narrowing the scope of those 
proceedings—with the goal of providing for timely, meaningful 
participation, settling issues on the front end, and providing licensees with a 
                                                 
 202.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (applying Goldberg’s three-
part balancing framework in an administrative adjudication to determine whether a 
procedural due process violation had occurred when benefits were terminated without an 
opportunity for an evidentiary hearing). 
 203.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.99(b), (c) (2011) (granting a licensee the authority to proceed 
“at its own risk with design and procurement activities” with regard to activities subject to 
ITAAC, stating only that the applicant must perform and meet all ITAAC (with no required 
oversight) and subsequently provide sufficient notice to demonstrate they have complied). 
 204.  See id. § 52.99(c)(1) (“The notification must contain sufficient information to 
demonstrate that the described inspections, tests, and analyses have been performed and the 
prescribed acceptance criteria have been met.”). NRC findings are based almost exclusively 
on the information provided in these periodic reports. 
 205.  See id. § 52.103(d) (setting forth the Commission’s discretion in choosing the 
procedure for a section 103(a) hearing). 
 206. Citizen’s Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 207.  See Citizen’s Awareness Network, 391 F.3d at 354 (setting forth a caveat to the 
ruling that the NRC’s procedural rules do not violate the Administrative Procedure Act). 
 208.  See supra Part II.B (noting the inefficiencies of the old regulatory scheme). 
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sort of blueprint increased certainty—all to reduce the risks involved in 
nuclear power projects.209 In a static world, this framework might prove 
infallible; however, in a construction phase that spans upwards of ten years 
that is affected by countless external factors—a spike in commodity prices, 
unrest in a supply nation, natural disaster, political crisis, and everything in 
between—change is inevitable. 
 The importance of providing an opportunity for a hearing for 
certain license amendments cannot be understated; however, the over-
breadth of the amendment requirements210 has already proven problematic, 
which indicates that this problem will only be exacerbated in the context of 
a combined license proceeding.211 Unless the agency revises its approach to 
handling changes throughout the development of a nuclear facility, the 
current amendment and hearing provisions set this fleet on course for an 
effective reversion to the delays and cost increases characteristic of the two-
step process. The “dirt issue” at Southern Company’s Vogtle’s site 
demonstrates how. 
 With its combined license pending,212 Southern Company charged 
forward with excavation activities pursuant to its Limited Work 
Authorization and authorized by its early site permit.213 In its August 2006 
ESP application, Southern Company made reference to the specific dirt to 
be used for backfill at the excavation site.214 Later, it became apparent that 
they needed more dirt than was available in the location specified, implying 
a change to the ESP would be necessary, and the agency strictly adhered to 
the regulation by requiring Southern Company to file a licensing 
                                                 
 209.  See supra Part II.C (describing the regulatory regime under Part 52). 
 210.  See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 52.98(f) (2010) (“Any modification to, addition to, or 
deletion from the terms and conditions of a combined license, including any modification to, 
addition to, or deletion from the [ITAAC] contained in the license is a proposed amendment 
to the license. There must be an opportunity for a hearing on the amendment.”); see also id. 
§ 52.39(e) (“The holder of an early site permit may not make changes to the early site 
permit, including the site safety analysis report, without prior Commission approval. The 
request for a change to the [ESP] must be in the form of an application for a license 
amendment . . . .”). These provisions refer to amendments to a combined license or ESP, 
respectively, and only the former triggers the hearing opportunity. Note that modifications to 
a standard design certification are not permitted unless the Commission makes certain 
findings in a rulemaking. See generally id. § 52.63. 
 211.  See, e.g., id. § 52.98(f) (noting that an amendment automatically triggers hearing 
rights). This is only the case in the combined license context.  
 212.  See generally Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Acceptance for Docketing of An 
Application for Combined License for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4, Nos. 
52-025 & 52-026 (ML 081480138), May 30, 2008. 
 213.  See generally Nuclear Regulatory. Comm’n, Early Site Permit and Limited Work 
Authorization, ESP–004, No. 52-011 (ML 092290157), Aug. 29, 2009. 
 214.  See Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Early Site Permit Application, 
Part 2—Site Safety Analysis Report, at 2.5.4-20–2.5.4-22 (ML 062290272), Aug. 31, 2006 
(detailing specifics of backfill). 
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amendment.215 The amendments (the first was followed by two subsequent 
amendments related to backfill) were eventually granted.216 The effect of 
these amendments was the approval of the following: alternative sources of 
onsite dirt not set forth in the ESP, the use of that alternative dirt (not 
initially described in the ESP), and the reclassification of that dirt.217 
However, authorization to take and use dirt from an alternative onsite 
location was not granted before the frenzy of dealing with the innumerable 
details arose—the NRC and others comprehensively addressed certain 
impacts of the proposed changes, for example the impact on Southeastern 
Pocket Gophers,218 over the course of several conference calls219—all in the 
name of determining whether granting an amendment to use different dirt 
would be okay. 
 Considering the multitude of changes that inevitably will present 
themselves, the consequences of requiring an amendment for insignificant 
changes will be detrimental, even with the mechanisms built into the 
regulations to expedite the process under certain circumstances.220 When 
changes are negligible, the licensee’s resources are wasted, the NRC staff is 
diverted away from important agency functions, and the door is left open 
for intervenors who want to bring chaos to a proceeding in order to halt the 
progress of a project. While frontloading the planning and decision-making 
processes was a laudable means to obtaining the agency’s objectives,221 the 
efforts will be for naught without some mechanism to handle insignificant 
                                                 
 215.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.39(e) (2011) (requiring an amendment for any change to the 
ESP, including a change to the site safety analysis report (emphasis added)). 
 216.  See generally Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Amendment to Early Site Permit and 
Limited Work Authorization, Amendment No. 3 to ESP–004, No. 52-011 (ML 101870522), 
July 9, 2010. 
 217.  See id. (describing Southern Company’s third amendment related to backfill); 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Amendment to Early Site Permit and Limited Work 
Authorization, Amendment No. 2 to ESP–004, No. 52-011 (ML 101760370), June 25, 2010 
(describing Southern Company’s second amendment related to backfill); Nuclear 
Regulatory. Comm’n, Amendment to Early Site Permit and Limited Work Authorization, 
Amendment No. 1 to ESP–004, No. 52-011 (ML 101400509), May 21, 2010 (describing 
Southern Company’s third amendment related to backfill). 
 218.  Southeastern Pocket Gophers are burrowing rodents that fall into the “Least 
Concern” category according to the International Union for Conservation of Nature, which 
assigns conservation status to all species. If placed on a continuum, the “Least Concern” 
category sits on the polar opposite extreme of those species that are listed as extinct.  
 219.  Summary of the Teleconference Calls Held with the Georgia Department of 
Natural Resources for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4 Onsite Backfill 
Amendment (ML 101670079), May–June 2009. 
 220.  See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 50.91(a)(6) (2010) (setting forth the provision that allows for 
abbreviated procedures in exigent circumstances so long as the agency determines the 
amendment involves “no significant hazards considerations”). This provision was utilized by 
the NRC when it addressed the “dirt” issue at the Vogtle site. 
 221.  See supra Part II.B (describing the risk-reduction, efficiency, and predictability-
enhancing as objectives of the new licensing scheme). 
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modifications. Further, absent some flexibility to handle change, hopeful 
licensees will have an incentive to minimize specificity in their application 
in order to avoid their own “dirt” issue, creating a whole new set of 
problems. 
 
IV. Staying Afloat: How to Achieve a Stable Regulatory Framework that 
Can Support a Thriving Nuclear Industry 
 
 If the combined license proceedings carry on as predicted, we may 
witness the beginning of construction of the first facility among this tranche 
of reactors by year’s end.222 With Southern Company’s current cost 
projections at $14.5 billion and the fact that the Vogtle units are just two of 
the twenty-seven proposed reactors on deck, the agency, industry, and the 
American public cannot afford a failure to fix the regulatory flaws set forth 
in Part III. 
 
A. Effective Management in the Context of Nuclear Development 
 
 In order to effectively address the ITAAC review and amendment 
issues, both industry members and the NRC face significant challenges 
going forward. Flawless management will be critical. Not only is effective 
management (in this complex setting) essential to ensuring a safe operating 
facility that enhances the general welfare,223 but it is also essential to 
gaining the public’s trust. Exemplary management requires painstaking 
documentation of (literally) millions of details, unfaltering communication 
among all parties, and organization of this body of information in a 
comprehensible fashion that allows for complete transparency. From the 
agency’s perspective, failure to take each of these seriously will cause it to 
be looked upon as the industry’s big brother, rather than the removed 
regulator working to ensure public health and safety. From industry’s 
perspective, failure to pursue all means to further these managerial 
objectives opens the door to legal challenges and threatens substantial cost 
consequences, which will lead to significant setbacks for nuclear 
projects.224 
 Early indications suggest that all parties are taking this seriously. 
Last July, work at the Vogtle site was suspended for two days after an 
internal audit conducted by the contractors revealed a failure to properly 
                                                 
 222.  See supra note 151 and accompanying text (noting that Southern Company 
expects its Vogtle COL to be issued in 2011). 
 223.  See supra note 199 (stating the purpose of the Atomic Energy Act, the basis for the 
NRC’s very own existence, which may inform one of the agency’s regulatory purposes). 
 224.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting the failure to manage in the case 
of the Zimmer and Shoreham plants, which ultimately led to failed nuclear projects after 
billions of dollars were spent). 
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document background checks of site workers.225 A company official noted 
that it was taking the “documentation and review process very seriously and 
[would] continue to regularly audit its practices," noting that "[s]afety-
related work [would] resume after procedural requirements [were] met 
. . . .”226 The NRC appears to be taking great steps to improve public access 
to information—in addition to its ADAMS web-based document room 
containing hundreds of thousands of documents, the NRC headquarters 
provides public access to millions of additional documents, and the agency 
is taking steps to provide easy access in a user-friendly manner.227   
With thorough documentation, communication characterized by 
full disclosure, complete transparency, and effective management leading 
every aspect of a project will come public trust in the regulators to do their 
job, even if the public is not actively involved as an official party in a 
proceeding.228 Take the issue that arose with the hypothetical ITAAC set 
forth in Part III.A, supra. With full disclosure and easy access to 
information, a member of the public can discover and make known that the 
closed ITAAC (even if implemented and met), because of a material flaw in 
its definitional phrase, does not in fact provide reasonable assurance of 
adequate protection of the public health and safety as required by the 
regulations.229 Even though the regulations preclude intervention, if the 
industry and the agency take these imperatives seriously, the interested 
party is not without recourse. Part 52 mandates that information “shall be 
complete and accurate in all respects”230 and requires that the applicant 
                                                 
 225.  See Stephanie Toone, Work on 2 Vogtle Sites Halted: Incorrect Background 
Checks Cause Abeyance, AUGUSTA CHRON., July 7, 2010, available at 
http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2010-07-07/work-2-vogtle-sites-halted (noting that 
the fitness-for-duty exam given to site workers, which included questions dealing with issues 
such as substance abuse, was conducted verbally and was thus insufficient, causing the 
company to halt safety-related work for two days while they took corrective action). 
 226.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 227.  See, e.g., Better, Faster, Stronger: The NRC Streamlines Content Management, 
CHIEF INFO. OFFICERS COUNCIL, http://www.cio.gov/pages.cfm/page/Better-Faster-Stronger-
The-NRC-Streamlines-Content-Management (last visited Dec. 4, 2011) (“The new ADAMS 
will provide a modern, flexible, and interoperable user experience that resonates with a 
younger workforce.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and 
the Environment). 
 228.  See, e.g., Harold P. Green, Public Participation in Nuclear Power Plant 
Licensing: The Great Delusion, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 522 (1974) (“The AEC 
should be relied upon and trusted to ensure adequate safety in precisely the same manner as 
is presently the case with the Federal Aviation Administration and the Food and Drug 
Administration in their areas of responsibility.”). Note that this call to increase the public 
trust in the (predecessor) agency was made while the last generation of plants was just 
getting underway. Today, this goal is attainable given advances in information technology. 
 229.  See 10 C.F.R. § 52.17(b)(3) (2010) (implying that a closed ITAAC will necessarily 
demonstrate conformity with the ESP, the NRC’s rules and regulations, and the Atomic 
Energy Act, which is not the case under this hypothetical). 
 230.  Id. § 52.8(a). 
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notify the agency if information is identified “as having for the regulated 
activity a significant implication for public health and safety or common 
defense and security.”231 With sanctions available for “deliberate 
misconduct” for violations of any rule or regulation,232 the party’s interests 
are safeguarded even if not permitted to intervene, and in the worst-case 
scenario, the party can take the information to the media. Fostering 
confidence in the agency, furthered by transparency of what is happening 
on the ground, will enable the regulations to overlay a solid foundation, 
encouraging the nuclear revival to charge forward. 
 
B.  Flexibility without Compromising the Dictates of the New Licensing 
Process and the URENCO Example 
 
 Southern Company’s combined license application references its 
own early site permit and a standard design certification for the AP1000 
reactor designed by Westinghouse.233 In March 2009, the ASLB considered 
a petition to intervene and submit three contentions submitted by five joint 
petitioners.234 One issue in the proceeding was that Westinghouse (who 
actually designed the AP1000 and obtained standard design approval under 
Subpart E of Part 52) was seeking to amend its certified standard design for 
the AP1000.235 Petitioners argued that since that revision was still pending 
(and the agency had recently received its sixteenth and seventeenth236 
revisions to the amendment), “a meaningful technical and safety review of 
the [combined license application could not] be conducted without the full 
disclosure of the final and complete reactor design,”237 which was 
incorporated by reference in the COL application. The ASLB rejected the 
contentions for their “failure to proffer a specific, sufficiently supported 
material issue regarding a safety concern associated with the interaction 
between the pending AP1000 [revisions] and the Vogtle [COL 
application].”238 While applying its characteristic strict interpretation of the 
procedural requirements for admitting contentions, the ASLB’s order 
                                                 
 231.  Id. § 52.8(b). 
 232.  See id. § 52.4(c) (prohibiting deliberate misconduct and referencing the 
enforcement mechanisms for any violation). 
 233.  See S. Nuclear Operating Co., 69 N.R.C. 139, 145 (2009) (noting that 
Westinghouse designed the units Southern Company referenced in its standard design 
certification). 
 234.  See id. at 145–46 (setting forth the procedural facts). 
 235.  See id. at 156 (noting that the previously approved standard design certification 
was facing potential modification). 
 236.  The agency received the eighteenth revision to the amendment on December 1, 
2010. 
 237.  S. Nuclear Operating Co., 69 N.R.C. at 155 (quoting the two nearly identical 
proposed contentions). 
 238.  Id. 
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expressed concern about the petitioners “realistic opportunity” to submit a 
future challenge after the AP1000 rulemaking, given the stringent 
admissibility requirements and timing issues.239 
 When the need for amendment arises in the context of a single 
application, complications arise; in the context of a combined license 
incorporating other licenses by reference, the complexity increases 
exponentially; and when implemented ITAAC are affected by these 
changes, one starts to get the picture of how a proceeding may quickly 
devolve into chaos while parties wrangle over how to proceed, perhaps over 
a change as simple as utilizing dirt from one area on a 3,100-acre plot to 
supplement the dirt that was specified in the application (from the same 
3,100-acre plot).240   
 There is an undeniable need for flexibility within this new 
regulatory scheme. How is this to be accomplished without forgetting the 
lessons of the past? Interpreting section 103(b) liberally to allow the 
interested party to request a hearing regarding the materially flawed ITAAC 
might seem prudent on first glance241—until one recalls how proceedings 
under the two step devolved into chaos when the ASLB essentially 
interpreted the procedural rules away, allowing parties to intervene and 
anchor a proceeding.242 Further, while amendment procedures may not be 
necessary to address certain changes, given the incredible safety factors 
implicated in a nuclear power generation facility, the issue cannot be taken 
lightly. 
 Thus, the NRC should maintain its stringent procedural 
requirements but look to other areas of nuclear licensing that have had 
success to serve as a model for the new nuclear plant proceedings. First, 
currently operating facilities can serve as a guide for how to deal with 
change. While amendments are required for some changes to an operating 
license, there are provisions that allow the licensee to make changes and 
then report to the NRC after the fact.243 Adopting a comparable provision to 
apply to new nuclear plants makes sense—while the Southeastern Pocket 
Gopher might not have had its time to shine, resources might have been 
dedicated to other more important areas had Southern Company had the 
ability to go ahead and use the alternate dirt (and had they followed up with 
notification to the agency). 
                                                 
 239.  See id. at 158 (expressing concern regarding the petitioner’s future ability to 
question the safety impacts of the revisions once approved, in light of the high threshold for 
admissibility, and ultimately referring the issue to the Commission). 
 240.  See supra Part III.B (discussing the “dirt” issue at the Vogtle site). 
 241.  See supra Part III.A (describing the hypothetical to which this refers). 
 242.  See supra Part II.A (explaining the two-step process and the Houston Lighting and 
Power proceeding to which this refers). 
 243.  See 10 C.F.R. § 50.59(c) (2011) (setting forth the criteria that, if met, will allow a 
licensee to fix a problem or make a change without obtaining a license amendment). 
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 The URENCO Group’s success244 in obtaining a license to operate 
a uranium enrichment facility under Part 70 of the regulations can serve as 
a model for attaining such flexibility in the Part 52 context. URENCO 
submitted its license application and environmental report under Part 70 in 
December 2003, the agency granted the license in June 2006, and the 
facility was inaugurated in June 2010.245 While the Part 70 scheme differs 
significantly from the new nuclear licensing regulations, the URENCO 
experience is instructive, particularly in light of how the judiciary handled a 
challenge to the legality of the operating license. Individuals living near the 
facility filed a petition for review of the NRC’s decision to grant 
URENCO’s license in the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia 
Circuit, claiming statutory violations.246 Petitioners alleged that “the NRC 
violated the Atomic Energy Act by ‘supplementing’ the [environmental 
impact statement] after the hearings on the license application,”247 along 
with several other claims, all of which were rejected.248 In its decision, the 
court found that the NRC had thoroughly considered the necessary 
environmental issues and looked beyond the environmental impact 
statement (“EIS”) to reach that conclusion: “In addition to the EIS 
document, the Licensing Board and the NRC subsequently developed an 
exhaustive record as they considered petitioners’ environmental contentions 
and supplemented the EIS. . . . The agency plainly met its NEPA obligation 
to take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of approving the 
license.”249 This suggests courts might be willing to leave the agency some 
room for flexibility with regard to applications and licenses under the 
appropriate circumstances. If this is true, there may be some relief to the 
agency seeking to alleviate the tension between requiring applicants to 
provide massive amounts of information to ensure public health and safety 
                                                 
 244.  See, e.g., Press Release, Nuclear Energy Inst., NEI Congratulates URENCO on 
Inauguration of Uranium Enrichment Facility in N.M. (June 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/nei-congratulates-urenco-on-inauguration-
of-uranium-enrichment-facility-in-nm/ (“This project is noteworthy for its status as a success 
story in nuclear facility licensing, for its considerable economic impact in the region, for its 
exemplary interactions with state and community leaders, and for its role in increasing 
domestic sources of uranium enrichment services.”). 
 245.  See Louisiana Energy Services (LES) Gas Centrifuge Facility, NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/lesfacility.html (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2011) (providing the license application and environmental report as well as 
other information about URENCO) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment). 
 246.  See Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory. Comm’n, 509 F.3d 562, 
565 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing the parties to the case and petitioners claims). 
 247.  Id. at 568. 
 248.  See id. at 571 (denying the petitions for review and upholding the NRC’s decision 
to grant the license to produce enriched uranium as fuel for nuclear reactors). 
 249.  Id. at 569. 
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and creating conditions that are not guaranteed to sink the agency under its 
own administrative load. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
 The two-pronged approach set forth in Part IV, supra, equips the 
NRC, together with industry, to conquer the legal and practical challenges 
faced as this fleet of reactors cruises toward the construction phase. By 
taking the steps necessary to ensure exemplary management on all fronts, 
and by providing for flexibility within the regulatory framework without 
compromising the agency’s hard line stance and other efficiency-enhancing 
tactics, the new licensing scheme may be judged a success. First, this 
approach will allow for better, and thus legally adequate, public 
participation, even absent increasing public access to these proceedings. As 
an ancillary but important matter, improving the flow of information and 
taking steps to ensure transparency will also increase the public confidence 
in the program generally. Second, in addition to eliminating the legal 
barriers, this two-pronged approach may have the practical effect of 
bringing about further streamlining of the licensing process, which will be 
essential to avoiding the defects of the two-step process that these 
regulations intended to cure. 
 The stakes are high for industry, the agency, and the American 
public. The benefits of creating a stable licensing framework to support a 
safe and thriving nuclear power industry are vast; realizing the ends the 
ITAAC process set out to achieve and effectively managing the licensing 
process in a dynamic world will make those benefits possible. Success will 
increase the contribution of cheaper, cleaner, more reliable energy within 
our energy portfolio, create tens or even hundreds of thousands of jobs, 
provide environmental advantages other energy sources lack, move us 
closer to energy independence, and bring immense economic benefits. In 
addition to losing the benefits, the costs of failure will not only be reflected 
on the income statements of Southern Company and its counterparts, but 
also on the value of the agency and on the electricity bills of you and me. 
With the combined license for Vogtle expected in the very near future and 
other projects close behind, the new licensing regulations are in their 
defining moment.  
